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ABSTRACT
This thesis was prepared to provide an understanding of the
evolution of housing policy in Massachusetts in the early
1980s and the reasons influencing SHARP's design as a "shallow
subsidy" program. The thesis seeks to review the program's
design and examine its connections to prior legislation and/or
ongoing policy debates; to review SHARP's initial goals and
determine whether these are being achieved; and to analyze the
program's restructuring mechanism. The study is based on
empirical evidence provided by the program's experience.
I argue, based on the evidence, that the program has achieved
its primary goals of rental housing production, increased low-
income housing opportunities, and that, while the program is
not as cost effective as would be expected, its overall cost
per unit is lower than that of the Section 8 New Construction
and Chapter 13A programs. I argue further, that several
factors, in addition to a general downturn in the economy,
have contributed to the need for many of its developments to
require a restructuring of their public subsidy.
Finally, I conclude that despite its problems (many of which
can be corrected) the program has left a strong legacy in
terms of it achievements, innovations, and in its successful
corrections of problems encountered by prior programs.
Thesis Advisor: Professor Langley Keyes
INTRODUCTION
In the early nineteen-eighties, Massachusetts faced a
housing shortage of unprecedented proportions, particularly in
the area of rental housing. Except for units supported by the
Section 8 Program', very little rental housing had been built
since the early 1970s. The Reagan Administration's withdrawal
from providing housing production incentives had removed the
stimulus to the production of affordable rental housing. As
more and more of the "baby boom" generation entered the
housing market, stagnant supply combined with record high
housing demand, resulted in rent increases which effectively
priced low and moderate income families out of the market 2 .
The state's existing rental housing program, the 13A
Interest Subsidy Program, which "bought down" interest
financing costs for developers from the market rate to 1%, had
become unworkable due to increasing construction costs and
1 The federal Section 8 program provides a rent subsidy directly to tenants
of a development (provided that they meet certain income thresholds) through
rental certificates. The government in effect agrees to pay to the owner of a
development the difference between 25%-30% of the tenants' monthly income and an
established Fair Market Rent (FMR) . Under Section 8's New Construction
component, owners could secure financing based on the guaranteed Section 8
leases.
2 In their April 1983 report to the Executive Director, the Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) Task Force on new housing initiatives argued that
these conditions mandated the development of "a new rental production program".
3 The 13A program was the state's mini-version of the federal Section 236
program. Under the program, lenders received payments amounting to the
difference between debt expenses at market interest rates and the debt expenses
at 1%. Savings were used to lower rents in the development.
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interest rates. Acknowledging the inability of the state to
continue bankrolling deep subsidies according to the 13A
formula, the incoming administration of newly-elected Michael
S. Dukakis, sought to develop a program which would stimulate
the overall production of rental housing and provide more
opportunities for low income renters, but at a more cost
effective price.
A Task Force on Private Housing Production (which
included legislators, the Executive Office of Communities &
Development (EOCD), the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
(MHFA), and other public and private housing professionals and
advocates) was appointed by the Governor to develop new policy
on a number of housing related issues. Their recommendations,
including a "new rental housing program" later to be known as
the State Housing Assistance for Rental Production (SHARP)
program, were formally presented to the Governor on April 25,
1983, and served as the basis for housing legislation that
would be enacted by the year's end.
SHARP, the legislation for which was signed into law in
December of 1983, represented a coordinated effort to bring
several housing resources together under one program. In
addition to tax-exempt bond financing provided through the
MHFA, the program also provided a 15-year state funded
interest rate reduction subsidy credited towards the project's
debt service. Since developers would be required to rent at
least 25% of the units created to lower income households, the
state linked the program to the federal Section 8 program and
the state Chapter 707 programs'.
From a public policy perspective, the new program was
attractive, for several reasons. First, it was perceived as
"cost effective". The shallow subsidy design subsidized the
effective interest rates down to 5% rather than the 1% under
13A program. The term of the SHARP subsidy would also be cut
back from the 30 years of previous programs to only 15 years,
and the subsidy was also expected to decline annually over the
period. Secondly, the program required that "not less than
25% of the developed units" would be used by low-income
households and that, when combined with the tax-exempt
financing, it might actually serve moderate income households
as well.
SHARP was also attractive on a more macro level in that
it might serve as an economic stimulus to the state's ailing
economy. In addition to producing much needed housing, the
program, if successful, could encourage new construction,
create jobs, increase tax revenues both locally and at the
state level, etc. As developer Gene Kelley, put it, "The
State was trying to get something going."'
4 The state Chapter 707 program, like the Section 8 program, provides a
rent subsidy directly to the tenants of a development (provided that they meet
certain income thresholds) through rental certificates. The state, in effect,
agrees to pay the owner of a development the difference between 25%-30% of the
tenant's monthly income and an established "Fair Market Rent".
5 Kelley, Eugene. Keith Properties and Member of the Governor's Task Force
on Private Housing Production (representing the private development community).
Interviewed in Boston, MA in October 1990.
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These issues aside, however, there was one particular
aspect of the SHARP program which caused uncertainty and
questioning at the time. Unlike any of its predecessors,
SHARP relied on market forces for its success. It was
developed, to a great extent, based on the expectation that
inflationary forces, present in the real estate market at the
time, would continue. As inflation continued, market rents
could be raised and the subsidy required to fill the gap
between "cost based" rents and "attainable rents" 6 would
diminish, and, thus, the need for the SHARP and direct tenant
subsidies would be reduced.
Initially, the program was very successful. Thousands of
units were created during the boom years of the middle
eighties. The significant pent-up demand for rental housing
allowed the rents to inflate yearly as had been projected in
the underwriting. However, seven years later a large
percentage of the developments financed through SHARP (along
with other real estate projects throughout the region) are
facing serious financial difficulties.
In fact, the present downturn in the economy has affected
the SHARP portfolio significantly. Developments have been
experiencing much higher vacancy rates and lower growth in
rents than projected. These factors, when coupled with
6 "Cost-based rent" is defined as the rent needed to support the mortgage
loan and operating cost of a project. "Attainable rent" is defined as the
maximum rent at which the units can be rented on the open market. SHARP bridges
the gap between the higher cost-based rent and the attainable rent.
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increased operating expenses, have put many of the projects
(and also the public financing agencies) in a tenuous
financial situation. The state must now either step-in with
additional financial resources to salvage the projects or face
the prospect of default and foreclosure if the developments
can no longer continue to meet their financial obligations.
Because of this, many are now raising questions as to whether
or not SHARP's shallow-subsidy inflation-driven design is
appropriate and/or realistic for producing and maintaining
affordable units over the long-term, particularly when faced
with unstable rental markets.
Although this was not the scenario which was hoped for by
SHARP's proponents when the program was being designed,
provisions for this possibility had been included in the
program's guidelines. Under "Section 2", the program had a
built in "safety net" which allowed for additional assistance
"only where general market conditions beyond the developer' s
control have jeopardized project viability". 7 The program's
many positive components notwithstanding, it is this "net"
which may ultimately prove to be the program's greatest
feature.
7 This one sentence almost seemed hidden within the broader financing text
discussed in Section 2 of the guidelines. In fact, it wasn't until as recently
as 1989-1990, when it was clear that the economy would adversely affect the bulk
of the SHARP projects, that the actual restructuring guidelines were negotiated.
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Purpose of Thesis
The SHARP program was the subject of a thesis undertaken
in 1986.8 In this thesis, the author, Gerald I. Brecher,
described the planning and political process leading to the
development of SHARP in terms of the work of the Task Force
and the MHFA. Mr. Brecher was only able to describe the
process up to the development of the program guidelines. This
present thesis is undertaken to build on the previously
undertaken research, but with the benefit of several years of
implementation and some eighty projects either completed or
under construction. Specifically, the thesis seeks to: 1)
to provide an understanding of the evolution of housing policy
in Massachusetts in the early 1980s, and the reasons
influencing the SHARP program' s design as a "shallow-subsidy"
program; 2) to review the program's design and examine its
connections to prior legislation and/or ongoing policy
debates; 3) to review SHARP's goals at the time it was
designed and determine whether or not these are being
achieved; 4) to analyze SHARP's built-in restructuring
mechanism (a.k.a. Section 2) and the issues faced as the SHARP
subsidy is "restructured" in light of the present economic
climate; 5) to make findings concerning the program and assess
its future. The ultimate hope being to shed light on the
variety of issues affecting this housing policy initiative and
' Brecher, Gerald I., "Requiem for a Subsidy: State Housing Assistance for
Rental Production (SHARP) in Massachusetts 1983-1986, MIT, September 1986.
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its implementation.
A number of central questions arise in the course of this
analysis: What assumptions formed the basis for the program's
design and implementation? Has the program met the goals
which it was designed to address? Are present problems the
result of some flaw in the program's design or are these
attributable more to other factors which impact on the success
of individual projects? Should the program be modified or
"restructured" in some way so that the housing created can be
better protected or is what we are seeing today simply a
"blip" which will be overcome over the long-term? Ultimately,
there is the question as to whether or not any program, whose
success is linked more closely to the market, can be designed
without endangering the financial stability of the projects
over both the short and long-term?
Although the thesis will describe certain federal and
state housing production programs used in the late seventies
and early eighties (Section 8 New Construction, Section 236,
and Chapter 13A), it will focus primarily on SHARP which was
developed in an effort to use increasingly scarce public
resources more efficiently and to make the housing which would
be produced more reflective of actual market demand.
Research Approach
A series of interviews with parties (both public and
private) who were participants on the Task Force which
developed the program recommendations, were conducted. Staff
at the MHFA and EOCD, who are responsible for the
implementation of the program and development of guidelines
and developers who have used this and other housing assistance
programs, were also interviewed.
The study includes a review of available literature
regarding this and prior housing production programs,
legislation, internal documents, etc. The thesis will also
present case studies of typical projects (some undergoing
restructuring) and analyze the issues which may have
contributed to their success or failure.
Organization
SHARP, in many ways, represents a continuing evolution of
housing theory and/or legislation. In this regard, it either
drew from previous programs or responded to problems inherent
in them. This "legislative context", within which SHARP was
developed, will be discussed in Chapter I.
The increasing involvement of the states in the
development and implementation of housing policy in the 1980s
was a significant factor in SHARP's development. This trend
will be discussed in Chapter II.
The remaining two chapters will focus more specifically
on the SHARP program itself. Chapter III will focus on the
program's design and development issues, whereas Chapter IV
will focus on the programs experience and achievements.
Chapter V will discuss the changing market and SHARP's
setbacks after implementation. Special attention will be
given to the recent "restructuring" of the SHARP subsidies in
light of the generally weak rental market and to other issues
adversely affecting SHARP developments.
At the end of Chapter V, a series of case studies of
actual SHARP developments will be undertaken. The intent of
the case studies is to look more closely at the various
factors which may impact the operating performance of the
jobs, as well as how financial problems are addressed through
the restructuring process. Chapter VI will present a summary
and conclusions.
CHAPTER I
PREVIOUS NATIONAL AND STATE HOUSING POLICY:
THE ISSUES WHICH SHARP SOUGHT TO RESOLVE
In many ways, SHARP was developed as a tool to take
advantage of existing legislation in order to promote the
construction of affordable rental housing. It was designed to
take advantage of resources made available under previous
housing acts (including bonding authority, tax legislation,
rental certificates, etc.). It is also true, however, that
SHARP was developed "in response" to prior legislation, and
with the intent of resolving problems inherent in the existing
housing programs and which limited their ability to meet their
desired goals.
SHARP can be seen as a descendent of some of the
previously enacted rental housing programs. It builds on
their positive aspects and tries to design out their negative
qualities. As such, it is influenced to a great extent by
experiences of past programs and the legacies available to it.
In this chapter, housing legislation will be viewed
through the "lens" of the SHARP program. The section will
raise and discuss the themes, policy objectives, and concerns
which SHARP was designed to address. It will also identify
the critical "legacies" which the federal and state
legislation left behind. These provided the "policy context"
within which SHARP was designed.
Because it is important to examine the program's ties to
prior or ongoing debates and to highlight the issues which
were being grappled with during the early 1980s, the chapter
will first discuss the major legacies or antecedents which
helped shape SHARP.
In the second section, these antecedents or issues will
be identified within the context of existing housing
legislation. With the exception of the federal Section 236
program, the names (or numbers) of the specific programs
implemented under the various pieces of legislation are
purposely omitted from the discussion9 . Finally, the chapter
will demonstrate how SHARP either responded to the problems
which they presented or incorporated their positive aspects in
its design.
Legacies and Antecedents
Three broad legacies or themes in particular, were
especially important to SHARP in that they represented either
challenges or resources guiding the federal and state housing
policy of the early 1980's. Together, these themes formed an
environment conducive to the development of SHARP. The first
of these is the legacy left by previous production programs
9 The Section 236, Section 8 New Construction, and the state 13A program,
are considered to be the major antecedents to SHARP.
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(221 d3, Section 236, and Section 8 New Construction) 0 .
These programs were problematic for the government in
three key areas: the length of the subsidy, the depth of the
subsidy (and their respective impact on the cost of the
programs to the government), and the lack of flexibility in
terms of what could be done if problems arose." Simply
stated, the issue was how to create a rental production
program which would be accepted by the market, whose cost
would not be exorbitant, which would be flexible enough to
deal with unexpected problems (not accounted for in the pro
formas), and which would provide benefits to the most-
needy. 12
Second, there is a legacy in some sense related to the
thinking surrounding early public housing. That is, the
notion that the housing created would serve a low-income
clientele which would "move through" the housing as they
10 The Section 221 d3 program was a federal "below market interest rate"
(BMIR) program under which the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) could
purchase the mortgages of low-income housing projects at a BMIR fixed at 3%. The
federal Section 236 program was developed to correct the "flaw" in the 221 d3
program. Not wanting to tie up public funds in financing projects for a long
term, the feds developed the "interest subsidy" technique which made payments to
lenders to buy-down the effective costs of debt service which developers would
pay for conventional financing.
"1 A clear example of this inflexibility is evidenced in the Section 236
program's experience during the oil embargo of the mid-seventies. Many
developments were unable to cope with the unexpected impact of increased fuel
(heating) costs on their operations. With no mechanism available to adjust the
public assistance levels, many of the developments were driven to default.
12 As will be discussed later, the issue of which clientele the SHARP would
ultimately serve proved to be a critical hurdle which MHFA had to address early
in the process.
entered the working/middle class 3 . In the context of SHARP,
this is the argument of people becoming better off with
progress and therefore needing less subsidy over time. In
SHARP, however, there is the added experiment of mixing
economic classes within the same development.
Within this legacy is MHFA, which itself is a "creature"
of the legislature. The agency's legislative mandate is to
provide housing in the Commonwealth to "people of varied
economic means". MHFA was committed to the "mixed-income"
approach to housing as a direct reaction to the many problems
encountered under the public housing programs. In SHARP, the
agency recognized an effective vehicle to continue to achieve
its goals. MHFA proved to be an important vehicle in SHARP's
implementation because of its well respected and established
track record and the technical expertise of its staff.
The third legacy lies in the long standing debate
regarding whether housing problems are most effectively
attacked from either the demand side or the supply side.
Legislation showed us two very different approaches to the
problem.
In earlier programs, the focus was clearly on housing
production (Public housing, Section 236, 221 d3) . Large
amounts of federal dollars were spent to assist in the
development of new housing opportunities in hopes that these
13 Taggart, Robert III, 1970. Low-Income Housing: A Critique of Federal
Aid. p. 12, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD.
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would ease demand pressures and address the needs of low-
income families. Later programs moved away from this notion,
choosing instead to provide assistance directly to the tenants
(rent subsidies or allowances). The intent of this demand
side approach was to increase the buying power of low-income
families and thereby allow them to secure units from the
existing housing stock.
These legacies developed over time as each successive
housing legislation either sought to address problems through
new programs or to perfect programs already in place.
HISTORY OF HOUSING LEGISLATION
To understand the structure and intent of the SHARP
program, it is important to first look to prior federal
legislative initiatives and policies and their experience over
time. Several shifts in national housing policy over time
have affected policy at the state level as well. This is
especially true of Massachusetts' housing policy in the early
eighties when the state was forced to increase its legislative
and financial involvement in housing in direct response to the
federal government's withdrawal from providing housing
production incentives under the Reagan Administration. In
fact, during the eight years of the Reagan Administration
(1981-1988) the total new federal budget authority for low-
income housing programs fell from approximately $32 billion to
less than $8 billion.
There have been several major and minor pieces of housing
legislation enacted at the federal level over the past fifty
or so years. These "Acts" have represented changing
definitions, ideas, directions, and innovations regarding both
the perceived nature of the housing "problems" over time, and
what were perceived to be the best techniques were for
addressing and resolving the issues at specific points in
time.
It is important to review these acts because, in many
respects, they form the foundations for present housing
policy. Through these Acts, many of our present day housing
and supporting agencies were created and many of the
regulations governing existing programs were promulgated. In
a broad sense, the legislative acts have provided the set of
tools and constraints under which many programs, including
SHARP, are now operating.
In his 1970 book, Low-Income Housing: A Critique of
Federal Aid, Robert Taggart undertook an in depth review of
federal housing legislation up to that date. This section
draws heavily on that research and also presents an additional
review of post-1970 programs and their experiences.
The National Housing Act of 1934 was the first major
housing legislation enacted at the national level.
14 Bratt, Rachel G. 1989, Rebuilding a Low-Income Housing Policy, Temple
University Press, Philadelphia.
Legislators, seeking a way to move the country out of the
Great Depression of the time, passed the legislation to
stimulate construction, create jobs, and support the mortgage
market. It was under this Act that the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) was first created to insure the long-term
mortgages which would be made to private individuals in order
to [make homeownership possible for these modest income
families].
The 1934 Act also established the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), and thereby facilitated
the growth of savings and loan institutions which provided the
bulk of private mortgages. The Act also authorized the
charter of secondary mortgage purchase associations
(eventually leading to the formation of the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA)), which provided a secondary and
national market for mortgages. With the adoption of these
measures, the Act increased the flow of private funds into
housing and extended the possibility of homeownership to
moderate income families.
It was the Housing Act of 1937, however, which initiated
the first true "subsidy" program in the form of Public
Housing. The Act authorized annual federal contributions to
amortize the capital costs of publicly owned housing built by
local agencies. These "subsidies" reduced the costs to
develop the housing and thereby allowed rents to be reduced so
that families, otherwise unable to afford adequate shelter,
could be properly housed. At the time, however, this housing
was usually restricted at the local level to the "depression
poor" (read: temporarily poor) . Early public housing was
thought to be temporary housing. It was expected that these
people would soon be able to pick themselves up again and that
living in this low cost housing would simply facilitate this
process. Families would only live there until they could re-
establish themselves and would then move on, opening the
housing up for others. The program really did not serve the
long-term disadvantaged families.
SHARP borrows some strands of this conceptualization of
the "purpose" of the housing which is created. With SHARP,
however, the argument of people becoming better off over time
is embedded and framed more specifically in terms of the need
for public subsidy. The notion is expressed specifically in
SHARP's "declining subsidy" design (as opposed to a flat,
fixed subsidy over time). While the overall notion of
progress is basically the same for both early public housing
and for SHARP, the approaches are very different. Public
housing's policy-makers accepted the idea of people becoming
better off over time, but did not specifically incorporate it
into their program design. SHARP's proponents "bought into"
the notion and created a program partially based around it.
This idea of declining cost was then used to sell the program
to policy-makers and legislators who were trying to lessen the
cost burden of these housing programs on the state.
After World War II, as veterans returned, they were given
preference for occupancy in the public housing. A year
earlier (1944), the Veterans Administration, targeting this
group, also launched its mortgage insurance program, which
guaranteed long-term home mortgages with no downpayment.
Coupled with FHA's programs, this made homeownership possible
for vast numbers of new buyers. With access to financing at
very favorable terms, and with other demographic trends (i.e.
baby boom, increasing households and also the Interstate
Highways Act) , many of public housing' s "middle class"
occupants moved on to private housing in the suburbs. Public
housing policy at the time seemed to place an increasing
emphasis on the needs of middle- and upper-income families, in
fact, facilitating their advancement.
This trend was subsequently reversed with the enactment
of the Housing Act of 1949, which redirected housing programs
to those families with lower incomes. This Housing Act
declared the national goal of a "decent home and suitable
living environment for every American family" and backed it by
authorizing 135,000 units of public housing for each of the
next six years, or a total of 810,000 units. The Act limited
public housing to very low-income people and required that
rents be at least 20% lower than the lowest private market
prevailing rents for decent housing. Cities were also
allocated grants and loans for urban renewal to improve "the
total environment as well as building new housing"".
During the 1950s, urban renewal and unassisted
construction became the heart of the federal housing effort.
The Housing Act of 1954, sought to enlarge and perfect the
existing housing programs rather than propose major changes.
During this decade, urban renewal activity was intense, and a
massive volume of relatively low cost housing was produced
under the FHA and VA insurance programs". The government
and housing sponsors moved away from the housing subsidy
programs and instead opted to address the housing problem from
the "demand side".
In 1959, however, a direct loan program was developed
which made use of the below-market-interest rate or BMIR
subsidy technique for the first time. Loans, at less than the
prevailing market rate (specifically at the federal borrowing
rate) were made to non-profit sponsors of rental housing for
the elderly. This represented the first recognition of the
separate and severe housing needs of that group.
The BMIR can also be seen as a predecessor of the SHARP
program which incorporated this technique as one of its major
components. Through MHFA, developers receive a below-market
interest rate loan as the first of two distinct subsidies
supporting the developments (the other subsidy is the rental
1 Taggart, Robert III. 1970. Low-Income Housing: A Critique of Federal
Aid. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD.
16 Ibid. p. 13.
subsidy provided to the eligible tenants). The effect of the
BMIR in SHARP is to lower all rents in the development to
somewhat below market levels.
In the 1960s, subsidy programs again became the center of
the federal housing effort. The Housing Act of 1961 now
provided assistance for families with incomes too high for
public housing but too low to afford adequate private shelter.
Through the FNMA, the government funded BMIR loans to sponsors
of rental housing intended for families falling in this income
gap. A significant change was incorporated, however, when
private corporations who agreed to limit their profits to 6
percent, were allowed to sponsor projects as well as non-
profit groups. SHARP encourages both for-profit and not-for-
profit sponsors and limits their profits as well. In order to
make the program attractive to developers, however, MHFA
actually allows them to boost the amount of equity credited to
them on paper. As a result, in most instances the dividends
which developers receive, are based on greater equity than
they have actually put into the deal.
By 1965, the BMIR programs became unworkable because
federal cost of borrowing had increased to such an extent that
the programs could not provide adequate subsidy to serve their
intended clienteles. In order to address this problem, the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 pegged the interest
rate under these programs at 3 percent. The subsidy then
became the difference between interest payments at this rate
and those at the higher market rate. A more far reaching
impact of the 1965 Act, however, was the creation of two major
rent supplement programs which were administered by the newly
created Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Under the first program, annual contributions were provided to
local agencies to enable them to lease of private dwellings to
be occupied by public housing tenants. Under the second,
payments to nonprofit and limited-dividend sponsors were
authorized to make up the difference between a fixed
percentage of occupants' incomes and market rents. These two
programs increased the involvement of the private sector in
housing lower-income families and also, from the government's
perspective, created alternatives to direct loans which tied
up large amounts of federal funds for long periods of time.
In 1968, the Housing and Urban Development Act continued
the trend towards a greater reliance on the private sector and
an avoidance of direct loans by the federal government.17  It
introduced a new "interest subsidy payment" to private
financiers, which reduced the effective interest rate paid by
nonprofits and limited-dividend sponsors. Two programs were
introduced using this technique. One, the Section 236
program, targeted rental housing for low-income families and
17 There was significant opposition, at the time, to using public credit
for housing. The Section 236 program was developed to correct this "flaw" of the
221 d3 program. Under 236, reduced rates were made possible by providing
interest subsidy payments to private mortgagees which would provide the
financing. By avoiding direct government loans, private credit could be used and
scarce public resources would not be tied up. The yearly "hit" to the government
was also smaller.
the other, the Section 235 program, targeted low- and
moderate-income homeownership projects. Under both programs,
production, financing, and ownership, were undertaken by the
private sector. A separate source of mortgage financing for
the subsidy programs was provided through GNMA and FNMA to
give them a greater degree of independence from conditions in
the private housing markets" 8 .
By the early 1970s it was evident that there were again
problems with the subsidy programs. Maintenance costs
(particularly heating oil had put severe strains on many
multi-family developments both publicly and privately owned.
While the government came to the rescue of the publicly owned
developments by appropriating additional operating subsidies,
many private owners were driven to default on their mortgage
payments'. It was the homeownership program (Section 235)
which received the most notoriety. Shoddy construction, poor
underwriting, outright dishonesty, etc. undermined the program
and produced high foreclosure rates20 . In 1973, President
Nixon called a moratorium on all federal housing programs
partly in reaction to the problems detailed above, but also
18 Ibid. p. 15. This particular point is important to note in that it
represents a view directly counter to that espoused by SHARP's proponents several
years later, The idea under SHARP was to make the program more reflective of
actual market demand and not to shelter it from the market.
19 It was this particular issue, of lack of flexibility to respond to
unforseen and/or uncontrollable factors affecting the financial stability of
developments, which SHARP sought to address under its Section 2 provision.
20 U.S. House of Representatives, committee on Government Operations,
1972a. Hearings on Defaults on FHA-Insured Mortgages, 92nd Congress, 2nd
Session, February and May.
partly because he wanted to cut the federal budget.
After a period of review and experimentation a new
federal direction was adopted. Emphasis was again placed on
housing low-income families, but this time it was through the
use of rental certificates which would subsidize their rental
payments. Under the program, primarily dependent on existing
privately owned units, private landlords were guaranteed rent
payments by negotiating multi-year leases with housing
authorities which administered the certificates. The
government agreed to subsidize the rents of income eligible
tenants while requiring that their share of the rent be based
on a fixed percentage of their monthly income.
Key to this broad shift in the government's approach to
resolving the housing problem was the new belief that there
was sufficient existing housing to house the needy. As
opposed to the Section 236 program, which was a housing
"producer/supplier", Section 8 attacked the housing issue from
the "demand side" by enhancing the buying power of the needy.
They could now use the certificates to secure decent housing
from the existing stock. Proponents argued that this approach
was better because there would be no construction lag time
(people could be housed sooner) and that existing rents were
almost always cheaper than new construction rents.
Under SHARP, the supply vs. demand debate plays a major
role. Not because the proponents chose one over the other,
but rather because they chose both. This trait is, perhaps,
one of the program's cleverest components. SHARP was designed
as a hybrid of the two approaches. While proponents would
argue that it is first and foremost a production program, they
also saw the virtues of tying it to the rental certificate
programs. The program creates units and then makes use of
existing certificates (which would otherwise be used
elsewhere) to reach the low-income groups. The certificates
also provide a steady stream of income to the developments.
The intent of the certificates was to reach the truly
needy by focusing on a "housing allowance" approach, and thus
avoiding a big hit on the federal budget. As a concession to
the private homebuilding industry, however, new construction
and rehabilitation components were also added to the program.
Producers of new housing units could secure private financing
based on a commitment (e.g. leases) of rental payments under
the program.
Ultimately, however, the Section 8 New Construction
program also met its demise. Subsidies for existing units did
not increase the stock of housing directly. The effect
instead was to increase the demand for available units, thus
raising their cost. Although low-income families were better
housed, others were priced out. With inflating rents, the
cost of the rent subsidy to the government became extremely
onerous. The program was soon perceived as too expensive, and
bottomless. In fact, the true beneficiaries were the
developers who were receiving large amount of subsidy dollars.
Tax policy, not incorporated in the above review because
it is only indirectly related to housing, was also important
to SHARP. SHARP used the tax-exempt bonding authority
available to the state to provide one source of subsidy to the
developments. Recognizing the many benefits provided by
syndication, SHARP also used tax policy to encourage the
development of affordable housing.
Conclusions
As the preceding discussion has evidenced, SHARP is
indeed linked to previous legislation and the experiences of
earlier programs. It represents a reformulation of the theory
of how housing can and should be delivered. While the
program, on the one hand, built on the tools made available
through previous legislation, it also tried, on the other
hand, to avoid the problems (such as cost, lack of
flexibility, isolation of particular groups, and quality of
the housing developed) which also plagued previous programs.
In its design, SHARP addressed the cost issues which
plagued the prior programs. It limited the term and depth of
the public subsidy and thereby drastically cut the costs
associated with it and, through the declining nature of the
subsidy, tied the program to the prosperity of the market.
Its use of production and leasing components resolved the
supply vs. demand debate. Under SHARP these became
complements rather than alternatives.
SHARP also made use of the various tools made available
through prior legislation. The interest reduction subsidy
(variations of which were first developed in 1959 and 1965)
became a key component of the program, as did the use of
rental subsidies to low-income tenants (developed in the early
1970s). The program even included tax benefits under its
umbrella and used it to make private investment in housing
attractive.
Also important, however was the fact that the program was
purposely designed flexibly enough to allow for additional
assistance if projects got into trouble. This was not
intended for individual projects, but rather for the entire
portfolio, and limited only to when there were circumstances
beyond the developers' control, which affected the portfolio
as a whole.
CHAPTER II
THE INCREASING ROLE OF THE STATES IN THE 80s
It is no accident that the SHARP program was developed
and implemented at the state level rather than at the federal
level. Throughout the 1980s, the federal government withdrew
from its previous role of housing policy-maker and housing
sponsor (in a long-term partnership with the private
homebuilding industry) through its programs. Over the past
decade, the federal government chose to play a lesser role in
this area and drastically cut its annual allocations in
support of federally assisted housing. As a result, the
states had to step forward in an attempt to fill the resulting
void with their own sets of housing programs and innovations.
In a 1988 paper on the role of the states in housing
policy 1 , Ian Donald Terner and Thomas B. Cook argued that,
during the late seventies and early eighties, the states had
exerted their powers in three basic areas including: 1)
innovations in housing policy and management of housing
programs, 2) the provision of housing finance mechanisms, and
3) regulation, planning and land-use decisions. Although the
roles which states assumed varied greatly depending on their
21 Terner, Ian D. and Cook B. Thomas, "New Directions for Federal Housing
Policy: The Role of the States" (paper) p.1. MIT Center for Real Estate
Development, March 1988
size, wealth, competence and quality of their leadership and
housing bureaucracies, as well as their perceived areas of
need, their move from spectator to player was rooted in these
three major areas.
This chapter, which draws heavily from the work of Mr.
Terner and Mr. Cook, will focus on the important role played
by the states in the development and implementation of housing
programs in the eighties. It will first review the states'
position relative to the federal and local levels and argue in
favor of the state level as the appropriate designer and
implementor of housing policy. The chapter will then focus on
the increased role of the states in housing production and
finance and at their use of sophisticated tools such as
Mortgage Revenue Bonds (MRBs) and Industrial Development Bonds
(IDBs) to help fund their housing initiatives. Finally the
chapter will discuss the states' use of regulatory powers, not
available to either the federal or local levels, to promote
the development of affordable housing.
The State: The Appropriate Level
Until relatively recently, the states had only a minor
role in housing programs. The federal and local governments,
coupled with the private sector, were the major players in the
housing arena. The federal government controlled housing
programs, interest rates, and housing tax benefits, while the
local level and private sector controlled land-use and
development. The states' role was primarily limited to the
promulgation of health and safety regulations and some smaller
housing programs.
In the last decade, however, the states have moved from
spectators to players in the development and implementation of
housing policy. Through increased activism in the targeting
of housing programs to their particular needs or priorities,
innovation in their responses and a coordination of the many
resources and players in the housing arena, the states have
been able to provide greater efficiency and equity in their
housing delivery systems. Thus, although the federal
government may continue to be the major force in the housing
arena, the states, nevertheless, have established themselves
as "powerful and constructive partners" .22
The state level appears to be the best suited for the
design and delivery of housing programs for a number of
reasons. First, recognizing that housing is a very local
issue in which particular market conditions, land use
decisions, and various actors need to be taken into
consideration, subsidy programs need to be managed by an
agency which is able to understand the local market. Given
the diversity of the states and their needs, the federal
government may not be able to design a program which addresses
the needs of all states. Further, it may be too removed from
22 Terner, Ian D. and Cook B. Thomas, "New Directions for Federal Housing
Policy: The Role of the States" (paper) p.2. MIT Center for Real Estate
Development, March 1988
local housing problems to properly evaluate them.
On the other hand, however, the narrow interests and
parochial nature of many of the local governments argue
against local control of the housing programs. There is a
realization that many housing goals require an ability to take
a larger view of housing problems and opportunities (i.e. the
siting of low-income housing, etc.) than is possible at the
local level. Finally, housing markets actually work on a more
regional or metropolitan level (where very few functioning
governments exist).
The state possesses some of the resources and information
of both the federal and local levels, and can also make use of
certain powers which may not be available to either. States
are able to study problems and formulate policies, like the
federal government, however, the states can also have an
understanding of and sensitivity to local issues. Unlike the
federal government, which is constitutionally prohibited from
having control over certain local matters, the states possess
regulatory powers over local land use, subdivision, and
building decisions (e.g. the "home-rule" tradition) . These
may be brought to bear when promoting particular goals.
State Housing Initiatives
The challenge of the states, in order to replace HUD's
prior housing programs during the late 1970s and early 1980s,
was to evaluate their particular housing problems, design
policies and programs to deal with the problems, and find ways
to support and implement the new programs.
Prior to the early 1980s, state housing policy tended to
mimic the housing programs already developed by the federal
government, but on a smaller scale. A good example of this
can be seen in Massachusetts, 13A and Chapter 707 programs
which "mimicked" the federal 236, and Section 8 programs,
respectively. However, although many of the states lacked
track records in the administration and financing of complex
programs, they met the challenge with a number of innovations,
initiatives, and, in some cases, institutions, geared at
resolving their own perceived needs.
In fact, during the period from 1981 to 1986, 300 new
housing programs were adopted at the state level. Housing
finance agencies, now present in almost every state, financed
the purchase of over 700,000 homes for primarily first-time
homebuyers and the construction of nearly 450,000 new
apartments nationally.
State programs had three main advantages over their
federal predecessors. They were able to target programs to
meet their own specific needs. This led to creativity and
innovation in resolving their own problems. Finally, the
states were better able to coordinate the different funding
sources and players which contributed to the development
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process.
The value of state autonomy in designing and implementing
housing programs was evident. Different initiatives resulted
from the different needs of each state, so that even two
states particularly active in housing could develop programs
very different from each other. For example, while California
targeted its resources towards providing emergency shelter for
the homeless, building new rental housing, helping non-profits
acquire residential hotels, etc., Maryland, on the other hand,
emphasized the rehabilitation of owner-occupied and rental
housing for low-income families, bringing substandard housing
up to code, etc.
In the example, different priorities shaped different
policies for each state. This prioritized allocation of
housing resources might not have been possible for program
designers at the federal level who were trying to make one or
a few programs work in all states.
Innovations came primarily in the various approaches
developed to provide the housing assistance. Differences
included choices between interest-rate subsidies or
development grants, whether to work with housing authorities
or private developers, or even the revenue sources employed.
In Massachusetts, where local housing authorities have a good
history of successful development and management of low-income
housing, the state has several elderly and special needs
programs. To encourage mixed-income rental housing, however,
the state opts to work with private and non-profit
developers.2
Some states, having a strong community-based tradition,
have been encouraging non-profits to become the primary
vehicle for assisted-housing production, whereas others, more
cognizant of the limitations of their own non-profits (either
too few or poorly run organizations), have chosen to work
through the municipalities.
Coordination of the various resources is a key advantage
of a state level implementation of housing policy. States are
in a unique position to coordinate federal and state resources
(particularly at a time when many funding sources are being
combined for increased leveraging or affordability) while also
encouraging community planning and private initiatives to
mesh.
SHARP itself is an example of this coordinated effort to
housing production. It builds on the tax-exempt bond
financing provided by MHFA by taking the benefits of this
reduced rate financing a step further. Through the state
funded "loan subsidy", rents are further reduced. The program
also uses either federal or state rental certificates to make
housing affordable to low-income families. Finally, sponsors
are encouraged to combine SHARP with other funding sources
such as Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), Urban
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Development Action Grants (UDAG), or Housing Development
Action Grants (HoDAG) in order to minimize costs.
An Expanded Role in Housing Finance
The states first became involved with housing finance
during the 1960s and 1970s. During this time they began
providing financing for federally subsidized rental housing
and thus leveraging federal funds into the states. Through
state government and the housing finance agencies (like MHFA),
which were being formed at the time, the states actually
positioned themselves to play an expanded role during the
1980s. With increased state level experience and capacity,
the states were able to expand their housing role even when
the federal withdrawal began.
States employed various means to assist the production of
affordable housing, including state appropriations for "mini-
HUD" programs from general revenues and also an increase in
the use of tax-exempt bonding authority to support both
homeownership opportunities (through Mortgage Revenue Bonds,
"MRBs") and rental housing construction (through Industrial
Development Bonds, "IDBs"). In fact, as was the case in
Massachusetts, many states successfully used IDBs to jump-
start sagging rental housing construction. The states' and
local governments' experience in using MRBs and IDBs provided
knowledge and expertise in housing finance. This provided a
foundation for innovations in other housing areas.
MRB activities, which have primarily occurred since 1980,
spurred new housing construction in areas where there was a
serious need for affordable ownership opportunities. Funds
were used primarily for the purchase, rehabilitation or
improvement of existing single family homes. Their primary
criticism, however, is that because of mortgage underwriting
concerns, MRBs benefit middle- and upper-income people
primarily.
Having each provided over $1 billion in IDB financing,
New York, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Jersey, Illinois,
Florida, and Maryland, have been the leading states in the use
of IDBs to fund new construction and the substantial
rehabilitation of apartments.25  Because of their counter-
cyclical role (injecting low cost financing into the markets),
they have been used to reverse downturns in rental housing
26
construction.
Critics of IDBs argue that, because they are tax-exempt,
their use represents a loss of federal revenues. The 1986 Tax
Reform Act responded to this by limiting the amount of bonds
which the states were able to issue and also requiring much
stronger targeting of low-income units in projects funded with
tax-exempt funds. The states should be commended for making
25 Terner, Ian D. and Cook B. Thomas, "New Directions for Federal Housing
Policy: The Role of the States" (paper) p.17. MIT Center for Real Estate
Development, March 1988
26 It is important to note that housing construction has often been used
as a stimulus to a stagnant economy. The Housing Act of 1934 was used to help
move the country out of that recession, just as IDBs have been used during this
decade.
use of this advantage to encourage the development of
affordable housing.
Regulatory Powers
States have been able to use certain regulatory powers to
overcome local obstacles to the development of affordable
housing. The states have the right to regulate land-use and
because of this are able to enact laws to guide local
entities' control of development. Many communities had
enacted local controls which did not favor the development of
low-income housing. State involvement in land use planning
mitigated these controls and actually encouraged housing
construction.
In Massachusetts, the state enacted the Chapter 774
legislation to streamline the process for the development of
subsidized housing. Such projects can now be awarded a single
"comprehensive permit". Under Executive Order 215, the state
ties the receipt of certain federal and state grants to the
communities' performance in encouraging affordable housing.
This provides local governments with an incentive to allow
affordable housing.
In Oregon, the state created a bureaucracy to undertake
a statewide comprehensive planning program having housing as
one of its primary goals. California also required local
governments to develop and implement comprehensive land use
plans. Also enacted was "fair-share" legislation which
allowed the state to determine the number and distribution of
needed affordable housing. Each community is required to plan
for the development of its fair share of the burden.
Conclusions
As has been argued above, the states have played an
increasingly important role in the housing arena. State level
intervention and innovation have served to encourage the
development of affordable housing. The states have made use
of several means ranging from financing to regulation to
achieve their housing goals.
As can be gleaned from this chapter, the SHARP program
has been an integral component of Massachusetts' overall
housing activities. It epitomizes many of the benefits which
the states were able to bring to bear on housing development.
It is a program devised and implemented at the state-level,
coordinating several housing resources which are targeted to
resolve an identified problem. Through MHFA, it makes use of
IDB bonding authority, reserved for the state, to encourage
rental housing production by non-profits and private sponsors.
In many respects, SHARP represented the cutting edge of
Massachusetts housing activities in the 1980s.
CHAPTER III
THE DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHARP PROGRAM
The intent of this chapter is to provide a sense of the
process leading to the development of SHARP. The chapter will
first provide a discussion of the factors which created an
environment conducive to SHARP's development. It will then
briefly review the work of the Task Force called together to
develop recommendations for new housing programs in
Massachusetts and look at the issues affecting the decisions
relative to the design (i.e. length and depth of the subsidy,
program components, flexibility, etc.) of SHARP in particular,
and how these were eventually incorporated into the final
program. Finally, the chapter will discuss SHARP's
experience and accomplishments over the seven year period from
its inception to the present.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SHARP
The development of the SHARP program was made possible by
the hard work and collaboration of a number of public and
private sector players called together "on behalf of Governor
Dukakis" shortly following his 1982 election to this office
for the second time. It was also made possible because of
other factors which set an appropriate climate for the
initiative in Massachusetts. These included: 1) the declining
federal support, and 2) acceptance of the need to reorganize
the state in response to this trend, 3) the housing crisis,
4) the recent tax reform, and 5) a solidly established
infrastructure to develop and implement the program.
Declining Federal Support
As previously discussed, the period immediately preceding
the program's inception was not very healthy economically at
either the state or national levels. In the early eighties,
under the Reagan Administration, the federal government was
cutting back its role in support of the production of
assisted-housing. Although the Dodd-Shumer bill (H.R. 1),
which had been proposed in an effort to keep some of the
rental production programs on-line (i.e. capital grants or
loans, interest reduction payments, etc.), was being debated
in congress, there was little possibility of the bill passing.
HUD Secretary, Samuel S. Pierce, had been quoted at the time
as saying that ". . .the President will certainly veto any bill
that authorizes as much spending as H.R. l. ,2
The State's Response
In Massachusetts, there was a recognition that the
state's existing program (13A) also could not continue in its
27 Citizen's Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA) newsletter, June
1983.
present formulation. Economic conditions, chronically high
interest rates in particular, had made them extraordinarily
difficult (read: expensive) to work with. The state, because
of its limited resources, could not continue to fund Section
13A, its traditional "deep subsidy" rental housing production
program. Further, it became evident that, given the lack of
state or federal subsidies in the future, new programs needed
to be considered.
Important to the state's response was the decision to re-
establish the partnership with the private sector which had
been abandoned by the federal government. Governor Dukakis
wanted to get the private sector involved in housing
development again. For this reason he included private sector
representatives to the Task Force. Their input would be
important in developing programs which would be workable and
acceptable.
The Housing Crisis
In addition to the first two factors (discussed above),
other factors in the early eighties contributed to the
development of the SHARP program in Massachusetts. Foremost
among them was the acute shortage of affordable housing.
There was an increasing public and political awareness of the
housing crisis and an acceptance that the public sector needed
to be involved if the issue was to be addressed successfully.
There was also a certain sense of urgency created by the
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housing crisis which helped to keep the process moving along
when it might otherwise have languished. It was the goal of
the administration to get the economy moving again and allow
housing's spillover effects to impact other sectors of the
economy. Any new program, therefore, had to be developed and
implemented relatively quickly. SHARP was very successful in
this regard. Eleanor White, Deputy Director and Chief of
Operations for MHFA, was especially proud of this
accomplishment. "We were able to design a program, push it
through the legislature, develop guidelines and have a
competition.. .all within a six month period. "28
The 1981 Tax Reform
The Tax Reform Act of 1981 also provided a major impetus
for the program's development. As one developer put it, "The
1981 tax reform had created an enormous incentive to invest in
real estate.. .the syndication market was very strong and the
short depreciation period was an attractive incentive"29.
Syndication became one of the major components of the program
by providing the financial incentives needed for developers to
participate. SHARP was designed, in large part around this
tax reform, to allow developers to reap the substantial
financial benefits (of syndicating losses, the Low-Income
28 Eleanor White, MHFA Deputy Director/Chief of Operations. Interviewed
in Boston, MA in December, 1990.
29 Gene Kelley, Keith Properties and member of the Governor's Task Force
on Private Housing Production. Interviewed in Boston, MA in October, 1990.
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Housing and Historic Preservation Tax Credits) able to be
achieved through the production of low-income housing.
SHARP's proponents keyed into these particular sources of real
estate profit and converted them into an innovative strategy
for encouraging rental housing production.
A Strong Infrastructure
Another factor, which cannot be overlooked, was that
Massachusetts had a strong housing support infrastructure
already in place. The MHFA and EOCD had long and well
respected track records in this area. Staff was considered to
have the technical expertise needed to develop and implement
new more innovative strategies. MHFA and EOCD also had a long
history of working closely with the private sector. In this
regard, there was a trust that the public and private sectors
could work together.
MHFA, long dedicated to a mixed-income housing
philosophy0 , was a key player in the program's development
and implementation. As a the program's primary lender, it had
a great deal at stake. MHFA and EOCD, which controlled the
federal and state rental certificates, became the co-
administrators of the program.
Given that existing programs were too expensive, there
needed to be new, more cost-effective, formulations to
3 During the 1970s, MHFA had financed many mixed-income developments. The
primary product was a 50% market, 25% moderate, and 25% low income development
which combined resources from the 236, 13A, and 707 programs.
46
encourage and support new construction. The program developed
would have to be workable for and acceptable to many different
interests, both public and private. Therefore, to ensure that
the program would not be designed "in a vacuum" but rather
have the benefit of input and evaluation by those who would be
working most closely with it, all sectors were included in a
task force which looked at many options for the new program
ranging from innovative financing mechanisms to a redefinition
of the clientele to be served.
COMMONWEALTH'S GOALS SHAPE THE PROGRAM
SHARP was developed to achieve three primary goals for
the Commonwealth. First, recognizing that there was a need
for rental housing for all market segments31, SHARP was
designed, above all else, as a "rental production program" and
not simply as an "affordable" rental production program. This
point was made explicit even in the selection of its name,
which purposely omits any mention of the word "affordable".
As Bob Kuehn stated, "The state wanted as many units as
possible and as low a cost as possible.. .Production itself was
good. "32  The argument was that production, even at the
higher end of the market, was good in that it would lessen the
strain of the demand of "floating yuppies" on the housing
31 This need is cited in the Task Force on Private Housing Production's,
April 25, 1990, report to Governor Dukakis.
32 Robert Kuehn, Keen Development and member of the Governor's Task Force
on Private Housing Production. Interviewed in Cambridge, MA, October 1990.
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market. It would "capture" them and thereby free up units for
others. According to Mr. Kuehn, Amy Anthony and other state
officials bought strongly into this argument. Production,
then, became SHARP's primary goal.
The second goal, actually related to the first, then
became to "provide expanded housing opportunities for lower
income households" specifically. A component had to be built
into the program which would target this group specifically.
As mentioned previously, many of these people were being
priced out of the market. The Administration could not allow
itself to be perceived as ignoring the needs of this group.
Affordability, as always, was a critical issue at the time.
Given that the third goal of the state was to limit the
financial burden which the implementation of a new program
would bring cause, it made the task of achieving the first two
especially difficult. The state simply could not bring to
bear the same resources as might be possible on a national
level.3
The development community was very much in support of the
program. Many of the players had been used to working with
the previous rental production programs (including Section 236
and 221 d3 at the federal level and the state's smaller
version of 236, the 13A Program). The SHARP program to them
3 Terner, Ian D. and Cook, Thomas B., "New Directions for Federal Housing
Policy: The Role of the States" paper. p. 2, MIT Center for Real Estate
Development, March 1988.
represented "the only game in town"34 . With their input, the
program was designed to allow them to take advantage of the
recent tax reform changes which provided incentives for real
estate investment through "paper losses" as well as tax
credits for the low-income housing which could be kept or sold
through syndication.
There was some opposition to SHARP from affordable
housing advocates, including Saundra Graham, Mel King and
Gloria Fox, who argued that scarce public resources should be
concentrated on affordable housing and not subsidize the
development of market rate housing. They felt that public
subsidies would be best employed if they were targeted to 100%
affordable projects. They felt that although less "total"
housing units would be built, there would actually be more
"affordable" units built with the same amount of subsidy.
The affordable housing advocates further argued that if
you set a percentage or a minimum on the number of affordable
unit which could be created (i.e. 25%), then developers would
develop only that number of affordable units and no more.
Ultimately, however, it was the need of the state, to get
the most units possible for the least amount of cost, which
won out. Given the scarcity of resources, people were willing
to accept the notion that production itself was good.
3 Gary Jennison, Corcoran-Jennison Companies, Interviewed in Quincy MA.
in October, 1990.
Besides, they argued, low-income units would be produced.
In order to satisfy all three goals, the program would
need to use all possible forms of assistance, including what
little federal resources were available. The objections of
the affordable housing advocates notwithstanding, it was these
three goals which provided the broad framework within which
SHARP was ultimately developed. The planning and inclusion of
specific components into the program was ultimately
undertaken, by the Governor's Task Force, with an eye to
achieving this mandate.
TASK FORCE ON PRIVATE HOUSING PRODUCTION
The Governor's Task Force on Private Housing Production,
described by Amy S. Anthony, the newly appointed Secretary of
EOCD, as "a small working group whose goal will be to develop,
over the next 60 days, a cost-effective program to stimulate
private housing production," began meeting in February of
1983.
The Task Force represented a broad base of interests
including MHFA, EOCD, Senator Joseph F. Timilty and
Representative John F. Cusack of the Committee on Housing and
Urban Development, private developers such as Bob Kuehn, then
President of Housing Economics, and Wes Finch, then President
of the Finch Group, both of whom have been very active in the
area of assisted housing; Pat Clancy, Executive Director of
Greater Boston Community Development (now known as The
Community Builders), a leading not-for-profit developer in the
state; and Howard Cohen, a Boston-based attorney active in the
assisted housing field. The Task Force was later expanded to
include other members of the real estate community.
While the Task Force concentrated on several housing
related issues including rental and homeownership initiatives,
it is the work relative to the rental component (SHARP) which
will be the subject of this section. There were several key
issues which the members struggled with over the course of
their meetings. These needed to be resolved prior to making
any recommendations for a new program.
In many respects, the Task Force had the benefit of being
able to learn through the evaluation of a succession of
previous housing legislation and the experiences, at both the
federal and state levels, of many prior programs. If a
successful planning process includes among its steps 1)
Evaluation 2) Design 3) Implementation 4) Experience 5) Re-
evaluation, then the Task Force was at the "re-evaluative"
stage. It could look at what existed, learn from previous
mistakes, and also choose from prior successes. It could use
this evaluative process to craft new solutions to existing
problems.
SHARP's proponents made a concerted effort to learn from
prior mistakes and to be innovative in their approach. Bob
Kuehn described this process as one of looking at what existed
and "marrying what existed". They put separately existing
programs together in new combinations. For example, under
SHARP, Section 8 certificates (read lease/demand-side) could
be combined with tax-exempt financing and tax credits (read:
production/supply-side) to make it profitable to do
development even if sponsors could only break-even on
operations. These two approaches to achieving affordability
had previously been seen only as "alternatives". Rather than
choose one approach over the other, SHARP incorporated the
positives of both into its design. SHARP could be similar to
the past but, at the same time, new and fresh.
Developing an appropriate subsidy model was the first big
task to be addressed. At the Task Force's initial meetings,
held on February 11 and February 25, 1983, members submitted
their own analyses of the problems faced in Massachusetts'
rental housing and also some suggestions on how they might
best be addressed.
The focus was immediately targeted towards the
development of programs which would stimulate the maximum
amount of production while minimizing the expenditure of the
state's limited resources. Armed with this mandate, a series
of brainstorming and proposal review sessions followed.
Previous programs, Section 8 and Section 13A in
particular, had become too expensive to support. Section 8
new construction subsidies in Boston were costing the federal
government some $10, 000 pupa (per unit per annum). The
state's Section 13A program was costing some $5,000 pupa over
a thirty year term. In the Task Force's report to the
Governor, these costs were seen as clearly unacceptable35 .
Any new program would need to be based not only on a much
lower subsidy amount but also a shorter subsidy period. To
achieve this, it would have to focus more on the middle-income
groups rather than the low-income groups. The argument was
that higher income households would require much less subsidy
than would low-income households and that, since resources
were scarce, the shallow subsidy would go a lot further. This
posed a serious question in terms of whether or not the
"public interest" would be served through this use of funds.
(The issue is discussed further below).
Bob Kuehn argued that while housing was doubly good (its
production provided an "economic good" and its consumption
provided a "social good") . Financing and production costs,
however, made it so expensive that most people could not
afford it, thus housing subsidies were needed to make it
affordable. These subsidies would vary depending on the
income group which was targeted.3
He further argued that to minimize the state's cost,
shallow subsidies for the middle income ranges and relying on
mixed-income projects would be most cost effective. He felt
that, given inflationary rent increases over time (as had been
3s Task Force on Private Housing Production. Report to Governor Dukakis,
April 25, 1983.
36 Bob Kuehn's "Housing Primer" for consideration by the Task Force during
the initial meetings. February 1983.
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the recent history in the rental market), the subsidy could
likely be phased out over a 15-year period and even be repaid.
Wes Finch proposed a similar program but with the subsidy
declining over only a ten year period. His proposal called
for 5% increases in rents over the period of the subsidy.
Another proposal called for a level subsidy to end after 15
years at which time the project would, through a series of
rent increases, be self sustaining. This proposal also
introduced the prospect of equity syndications to fund the
projects.
Over the course of the discussions, it became evident
that rental housing costs were primarily embedded in the
capital costs to produce the housing. High construction costs
had meant a larger amount to be financed. Given high interest
rates, this translated into higher debt service payments which
then showed up in terms of higher rents needed to support the
developments. In order to address the impact of capital costs
on affordability of rents, either production costs would have
to be reduced or the cost of financing would have to be
reduced.
In reality, however, while the escalation of capital
costs should ideally be controlled, history had shown that it
was far more difficult to attack the cost issue on this front
than if attention were directed to reducing the financing
cost. The interest rate subsidy was therefore chosen as one
of the appropriate vehicles for subsidizing the units created.
The issue then became how much subsidy should be
provided. Some form of subsidy was required to bring rents
down to a level which would make them affordable to the
targeted groups. The lower the incomes being served, the
greater the amount of the subsidy needs to be for each unit
served, and conversely, the higher the incomes being served,
the lower the subsidy needed.
Given limited resources, the program's proponents opted
for targeting a higher income clientele, thereby getting more
units for less dollars. There was some opposition to this
approach from affordable housing advocates who argued that
scarce public resources should be concentrated on affordable
housing and not subsidize the development of market rate
housing. The advocates argued that public subsidies would be
best employed if they targeted to 100% affordable projects.
They maintained that although less "total" housing units would
be built, there would actually be more "affordable" units
built with the same amount of subsidy. The argument for
limiting state costs ultimately won out .37
Affordability was still a concern, however, and according
to Joe Flatley, the assistant to Secretary Anthony who
"staffed" the Task Force meetings, a major step in the
37 Brecher, Gerald I. "Requiem for a Subsidy: SHARP in Massachusetts 1983-
1986", MIT, September 1986. pp. 27-38. This change in the income group targeted
forced a subtle but important change in MHFA's enabling legislation because MHFA
would be targeting a group not legally considered low income. MHFA won this
argument on the basis of the "rent skewing" concept. It maintained that low-
income tenants would indeed be served primarily through an internal subsidy
created by charging the moderate-income renters higher rents and thus lowering
the rents of the low-income tenants.
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development of SHARP was the "separation of the different
forms of subsidies". There would be two different forms of
subsidies going into the projects. One was the interest
reduction subsidy (made possible through tax-exempt financing
and the monthly SHARP subsidy) which would write down the
rents of the whole development to a certain level and the
other was the Section 8 or Chapter 707 certificate which went
directly to the low income tenants to make the rents
affordable to them. The two programs, which had been
previously seen as alternatives, were now made complementary.
Under both of these scenarios, the federal government
would bear the brunt of the cost burden. The feds would
provide a subsidy, on one hand, by allowing the tax-exempt
bonding and, on the other, by subsidizing the tenants through
Section 8. The state's Chapter 707 subsidies would only be
used, on a back-up basis, if the federal certificates were not
available.
The state would really only be responsible for the SHARP
subsidy which was designed (for tax reasons favoring the
developers) as a loan. The subsidy was expected to decline
over the term (which had already been cut from 30 years to 15
years). The thinking behind the declining nature of the
subsidy was that if rents and expenses were trended at the
rate of inflation, then over time the increase in rents would
more than offset the increase in expenses until at some point
(typically the fifteenth year) no subsidy would be needed 8 .
The subsidy, which would initially be high, would then decline
as rents covered more and more of the gap between revenues and
expenses plus debt service (see Graph 1).
Revenues
Expenses
SHARP
Subsidy
Debt Service
15
The final piece of the SHARP puzzle, and ultimately the
most attractive to the private sector was the tax benefits
provided under 1980's tax reform act. Although not used in
all SHARP developments, this act had made investment in
affordable housing (and real estate in general) very
profitable for developers and investors by providing tax
shelters through an accelerated depreciation of the buildings,
and also through Historic Preservation and Low-income tax
38 Since rents represented a higher amount than expenses to begin with,
they would grow at a faster rate overall than expenses.
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credits. This helped the program in two ways. First, it got
people to invest in affordable housing, and second, it made
the development deals stronger. Developers both for-profit
and non-profit could use syndication to raise the required
equity for the deals.
The financial viability of projects was the primary
concern of MHFA, even ahead of the social benefits proposed
(i.e. % affordable units, day care, community center, etc.).
"First and foremost, SHARP projects need to be strong real
estate deals.. .then come the points" was how Eleanor White,
MHFA's Deputy Director/Chief of Operations, put it.
Even after the tax laws were changed with the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, which eliminated many of the incentives for real
estate investment, syndication continues to be a key component
of the SHARP program, through the Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit 39 which was retained by the federal government after
much lobbying on the part of MHFA and other affordable housing
advocates.
As finally designed, SHARP incorporated several key
components. First, it included tax-exempt financing as an
initial subsidy. This was combined with the SHARP subsidy
itself as a second layer of subsidy. These two can be seen as
the "production-oriented" components of the program. SHARP
then tied the low-income units to the Section 8 or Chapter 707
39 The Low-income Housing Tax Credit is a provision of the tax laws which
allows NANCY???
certificate programs, which can be seen as the program's
"demand-oriented" components. Syndication, which is
considered to be a production-oriented component, may or may
not be included as part of the developments, but often
provides the primary incentive for private investment in the
deals. At the end of the fifteen year subsidy term, the SHARP
"loans" can either be repaid to the state or be recycled to
the projects to ensure the long-term affordability of the
units.
Together, these primary components form the foundations
of the program. They are then combined with many "free-market"
factors such as the quality of the location, good design,
experience of the development team, strong management, etc.
As a whole, they play a large role in determining whether or
not individual projects will be socially and financially
viable.
Conclusions
As discussed in the chapter, there were many key factors
which lent themselves to the development of SHARP. The
housing crisis, declining federal support, the state's
willingness to step in, etc. All of these were important.
Also key to SHARP's successful implementation were the roles
played by the members of the Governor's Task Force. The
public/private partnership which was formed enabled all
parties affected by the program to raise their concerns and
provide input into the design of the program.
The three broad goals which formed the framework of the
program (production, low-income opportunities, limited cost to
the state) were able to be achieved through the incorporation
of various forms of subsidy into the program. Although the
program limited state cost by targeting higher income
households (and, therefore, reducing the subsidy required per
unit), it also addressed the needs of the low-income families
through the use of the Section 8/Chapter 707 certificates.
This not only helped the low-income families, but it also
helped developers by providing a steady stream of income.
State costs were also mitigated by making use of bonding
and syndication (actually federal subsidies) as major
components under the program and, in fact, these played a
major role in the acceptance of the program by the private
development community as well as the nonprofit community which
saw syndication as a way of raising much needed equity for the
projects.
There were many positive developments which came of the
design process. Not only did it produce many innovations in
how housing was delivered and in the resources which were
tapped, but it also provided a means for re-establishing and
strengthening the relationship between the public and private
sectors in the development of affordable housing.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SHARP EXPERIENCE
SHARP's contributions to the production of rental housing
in the Commonwealth have been important for several reasons.
Not only have thousands of units been created over the six
year period following its inception, but these SHARP
developments have continued to remove much of the stigma
surrounding "assisted housing" through the quality their
design and their maintenance over the years.4
These contributions have not come without setbacks,
however. The changing marketplace, higher than expected
operating costs, competition, and other factors are currently
creating some financial uncertainty for the portfolio.
Despite these factors, and, in fact, because it should be able
to correct them, SHARP continues to be an excellent example of
how a public/private partnership can be used to achieve
important and complementary goals.
This chapter will discuss SHARP's performance in terms of
addressing the goals which were established for it at the
outset. While SHARP has, for the most part, lived up to and
40 Several of the developers and staff interviewed referred to SHARP
developments as representing the "best housing" in many of the communities in
which they are located. As mixed-income developments, these qualities were key
to their acceptability during permitting and marketability once in operation.
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even exceeded the expectations of its proponents, some
questions still remain with regard to cost.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
As previously discussed, SHARP was designed to address
three main goals: 1) rental housing production, 2) increased
opportunities for low-income families, and 3) a "cost-
effective" means of delivering such a program. It is
according to these measures, then, that the program should
initially be judged. These measures are fairly easy to
quantify based on SHARP's six years of operation. These,
however, should not be the only measures used. SHARP's
achievements also need to be placed within an evolutionary
context (in terms of housing policy) . Its success in
correcting the "mistakes" of prior programs (i.e. 221 d3, 236,
Section 8, 13A), which were discussed earlier, should also be
important factors. These factors, therefore, will also be
discussed below.
Rental Production
SHARP has been successful in this regard. Since its
inception, the program has produced 9,369 total units (an
average of over 1,500 per year) under four funding rounds.
(See Table 1 for breakdown of SHARP developments by funding
round). More importantly, however, much of this housing was
created at a time when no other subsidized housing was being
developed at either the state or national level. In fact,
according to Eleanor White, SHARP production, at one point in
time, represented 50% of the national total for state assisted
production.
SHARP PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS (BY FUNDING ROUND)
BASED ON ORIGINAL UNDERWRITING CRITERIA
SHARP TOTAL TOTAL LOAN SHARP AVG. LOAN AVG. SHARP
ROUND PROJECTS UNITS AMOUNT AMOUNT AMOUNT/UNIT AMOUNT/UNIT
I 33 3,209 200,604,517 8,579,723 62,513 2,674
1I 11 1,077 95,180,910 3,784,236 88,376 3,514
III 11 1,517 136,761,150 5,602,511 90,152 3,693
IV 11 1,130 127,541,680 4,057,665 112,869 3,591
MHP 14 2,316 251,414,368 6,229,993 108,555 2,690
ALL
ROUNDS 80 9,249 811,502,625 28,254,128 87,739 3,055
Conditions were ripe for SHARP when it first implemented.
During the first round of funding, which was undertaken in the
spring of 1984, the state committed funds to 33 total projects
accounting for 3,209 total units. MHFA provided $200,604,517
in construction and permanent financing.
The fact that the BMIR financing was provided through
MHFA's sale of bonds was a boon to the state. This
represented a federal subsidy to the projects which, from the
state's perspective, was a "freebie" in that there was no
direct cost to the state for this piece of the total subsidy.
Use of the bonding mechanism was also in keeping with the
broader public sector desire to avoid tying up scarce public
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funds for prolonged periods.
In the second round, awarded in June of 1985, 11 jobs
were funded, producing an additional 1,077 total units. MHFA
provided financing in an amount just short of $100 million.
In Round III, awarded in June of 1986, another 11 jobs were
funded. These produced just over 1,500 new units with MHFA
financing amounting to some $136 million. The fourth and
final SHARP round (to date) was awarded in February of 1988.
In this round 12 projects were funded, creating 1,161 new
units. MHFA provided $129 million in financing. SHARP also
funded several Massachusetts Housing Partnership (MHP)
projects (totalling 14) under a separate process.
SHARP fares well when its production totals are compared
to the achievements of Section 8 New Construction and the 13A
program which had become too costly due to changing economic
factors.
According to MHFA records, during the 13A program's nine
years of operation, 6,586 units were created (or an average of
just over 730 per year. The program produced a high of 2525
units (23 jobs) in 1975. By the end of the decade, however,
the economic climate had changed drastically and, as a result,
production dropped off significantly. In its final year 1983,
only 48 units were created in a project that had actually been
in the pipeline since 1979.
41 As discussed earlier, the Section 236 program had also been created to
correct this "flaw" of the 221 d3 program. By selling bonds to finance the
developments, SHARP was able to avoid direct public financing.
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The 13A program was affordable to the state as long as
market interests rates remained relatively low, however, under
inflationary periods rates soared and yearly appropriations,
under these conditions, bought less and less units. As a
result, the state was unable and unwilling to continue the
subsidy under the deep subsidy formula.
Over a fourteen year period (1971-1984), MHFA financed a
total of 17,220 units4 2 (or some 1, 230 per year) under all
four of the Section 8 components (New Construction,
Substantial Rehab, Moderate Rehab, as well as the free
standing certificates to families). Of this total, 8,387
units (49%) were done under the New Construction program
43alone, representing approximately 600 units per year4.
These jobs tended to be almost 100% low-income so that
the government would provide rent subsidies to almost all of
the units. Since the New Construction program targeted very
low-income households, the gap between what the developments
cost to operate and what tenants could afford to pay, was
particularly large (and therefore expensive).
Given that SHARP is a market-driven program, "prime"
42 It should be noted that this sample does not encompass the entire
Section 8 program in Massachusetts. Many other developments were done under the
auspices of the housing authorities and therefore, are not included here.
4 The Substantial Rehabilitation component is very similar to the New
Construction component (i.e. unit creation) . Under the MHFA record keeping
system, Section 8 components are differentiated by an alphabetical suffix ("N"-
new, "R"-rehab, "M"-Mod, etc.). Given that "R" can be used for various types of
rehabilitation, it could not readily be determined which of the projects,
designated with this letter, were Substantial Rehabilitation and, therefore,
could be counted as units produced.
locations (i.e. central, desirable, access to transportation,
amenities, etc.) are a key ingredient to the success of its
developments. The geographic distribution of SHARP
developments is indicative of the state's desire to spread the
benefits throughout the Commonwealth. SHARP developments have
been created not only in strong markets but in weaker market
areas as well. While most of this housing has been created in
urban areas in eastern Massachusetts, many developments have
also been developed as far west as Springfield and in rural
areas such as Greenfield and South Hadley. Projects have also
been developed as far north as Lowell and Lawrence and as far
south as Fall River and New Bedford (See Graph 2 for a
geographic distribution of developments).
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In order to reach the needy clienteles of weaker markets
(such as South Hadley, Worcester, Gardner, etc.), decisions
were made to either couple SHARP with other forms of public
subsidy (and thus increasing the amount of public subsidy in
the jobs), or to require that developers agree to make
additional scheduled contributions to the projects at
underwriting. Most projects can survive and even prosper
under a strong economic climate, under a down economy,
however, the projects in the weaker locations will probably be
the most adversely affected. While this political decision to
move the program into less desirable locations may have a
negative impact, need in those communities made it necessary.
Opportunities for Low-Income
The program requires that no less than 25% of the total
units in a development be designated for rental to low-income
families. This itself would be a significant accomplishment.
However, the results of a recent survey of 6,221 SHARP
households indicated that 37.5% of the units were rented to
low-income households. This is well in excess of the 25%
requirement and should mitigate some of the concerns raised by
the affordable housing activists in the program's design
stages. They had felt that by setting a low-income unit
percentage, that developers would only develop that amount.
The survey showed further that 44% of the market rate
households earned under $35,000 per year. This demonstrated
that, even through the market rate component, SHARP was
serving a substantial number of moderate-income households.44
In light of these figures, it would seem that the program
was again successful in achieving its goal of creating
expanded housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income
households.
Cost-Effectiveness to the State
The issue of cost effectiveness is not as clear. In
fact, much depends on the interpretation of the nature of the
subsidy source. In terms of the state's interest rate
reduction subsidy, SHARP has, until recently, been very cost
effective to the state. By targeting a higher income
clientele than the previous programs, the state was able to
lower the amount of its annual subsidy since lower income
households require greater subsidy.
Proponents wanted to make the SHARP subsidy sufficiently
deep, however, to allow the developments rents to be brought
in line with the Section 8 Fair Market Rents. By doing this,
the program was able to target low-income certificate holding
tenants for its deep subsidy demand side component.
The average SHARP subsidy amount under the original
underwriting was $2,674 per unit per annum during the first
round of funding. In subsequent rounds this figure grew to
$3,514 and $3,693 before falling slightly to $3,591 for the
44 MHFA Fiscal Year Annual Report for the Year Ended June 30, 1990.
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fourth round. MHP projects, typically combining funds from
various other programs, averaged $2,690 as a whole (the per
round breakdowns are also seen in Table 1). The increased
subsidy amounts in later rounds are probably due to a
combination of increased construction costs, weaker bond
market conditions, and the development of SHARP "cadillac"
projects in order to compete with the burgeoning condominium
market of the mid-eighties.
These figures were well below the per unit per annum
subsidy costs experienced under the 13A program ($5,000 per
unit per annum in 1983) and the Section 8 program ($10,000 per
unit per annum in 1983) and, in fact, according to preliminary
restructuring numbers, although the amount of the SHARP
subsidy has increased, it will still be significantly more
cost effective than the subsidy under the 13A and Section 8
programs. Today's SHARP subsidy is expected to cost just over
$4,000 after restructuring. Conversely, if the 13A and
Section 8 per unit per annum costs, prevalent in 1983, were
expressed in terms of today's dollars, their costs would be
$6,985 and $13,970 respectively 5.
The dispute regarding the "actual" cost of the program is
embedded in the program's use of the deep subsidy certificate
programs. Under the guidelines, the low-income units must
first be marketed to existing "Section 8 or Chapter 707"
4 These 1990 figures are calculated from the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
figure for all urban consumers, northeast urban region, for housing of 140.7 in
October 1990. The October 1983 CPI is 100.7. 1982-1984=100.
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certificate holders. If no certificate holders are able to be
found, then 707s will be made available to the project on a
"back-up basis".
While use of the federally funded Section 8 certificates
involves no additional cost to the state, the Chapter 707
subsidies are state funded and, therefore, do represent a
direct cost. The average per unit per annum cost of a 707
rental subsidy in a SHARP development is about $6, 600 per unit
per annum.4" As the Section 8 certificates become more
scarce, 707s are more likely to be used. The "back-ups",
which are project based, are more likely to be used in the
more rural developments where existing certificate holders may
be unwilling to locate.
Depending on the number of 707s which are ultimately used
in the developments, the total cost of the program to the
state (the interest rate reduction plus the 707 subsidy to the
tenants) is inevitably increased. For example, assuming a 100
unit development where 25% of the units are low-income, the
annual SHARP subsidy would be $4,000 per unit for 100 units
and $6,600 per unit 707 subsidy for 25 of the units. As a
result, the actual state subsidy to the development would be
$5,650 per unit per annum. Not as cost effective as with the
Section 8 certificates but still better in terms of cost per
unit produced than the prior programs.
* According to EOCD staff, a 707 subsidy in a SHARP development costs the
state approximately $550 monthly per unit. This figure is somewhat higher than
the $507-$511 monthly cost for a 707 subsidy in other existing or new housing.
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It must be emphasized, however, that an economic decision
was made to have SHARP primarily serve a higher income
clientele than the 13A and Section 8 programs. Those two
programs served needier clienteles and therefore required
deeper subsidies. SHARP is a shallow/deep hybrid. It serves
a higher income clientele with its shallow subsidy and then
adds the deep subsidy (certificates) to a portion of the units
in order to serve the low-income households. Not as many
lower income households are reached under SHARP as under 13A
and Section 8.
Conclusions
Experience has shown that SHARP has performed as well or
better than expected with regard to its goals for production
and increased low-income opportunities. SHARP fares well when
compared to the state's prior production programs and, at 37%,
achieved a greater percentage of low-income units overall than
was required under the program's guidelines.
The program does not do as well in terms of cost to the
state. In addition to the interest write down subsidy (i.e.
SHARP), many developments are also receiving subsidy through
the Chapter 707 certificate program which in many instances
replaces the Section 8 program. Although the 707 demand side
subsidy is indirect (generally targeted to tenants rather than
the developments), it still represents additional state
subsidy into the deals. The actual state cost of the SHARP
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developments, therefore, is actually higher than the per unit
SHARP interest reduction subsidies would lead you to believe.
Also, the fact that SHARP, Section 8 New Construction,
and 13A, targeted different income groups, by design, makes
the cost effectiveness comparison even more difficult.
Section 8 and 13A targeted lower income clienteles and, by
default, required deeper subsidies.
CHAPTER V
THE CHANGING MARKETPLACE FOR RENTAL HOUSING
The decade of the eighties showed us one of the most
prosperous periods in the history of the state. The early
part of the decade brought us a boom period of increased and
better paying employment, state budget surpluses, burgeoning
housing and commercial construction, among other things. The
latter part of the decade, however, has shown us a completely
different picture. It has shown us a recessionary economy,
plant closings, lay-offs, state budget deficits, and an
increasingly troubled real estate market.
These changes in the macro-economic climate had very real
impacts on SHARP. Early on, economic conditions had provided
a ripe environment for the development of rental housing in
Massachusetts, later, the situation had changed drastically.
While SHARP prospered initially, in later years, many of its
developments encountered serious financial difficulties. A
downturn in the economy was not, however, the only reason that
SHARP projects ran into trouble. Other realities, not
accounted for in the initial operating pro formas had serious
impacts as well, and also triggered the need for additional
state subsidies.
This chapter will discuss 1) the changing marketplace for
rental housing in the state; 2) the causes of the change and
their effect on the SHARP portfolio; 3) the issues relating to
restructuring and the development of the "Restructuring
Guidelines" which were developed in order to honor the state's
commitment to re-evaluate the SHARP subsidy in light of the
downturn in the real estate economy and other unforseen
factors.
The Changing Economy
SHARP was born in a period of strong economic growth.
New, better paying, jobs were being created. Higher incomes
meant that people could demand more and better goods,
including housing. The lack of construction of rental housing
during the preceding years had created a situation of strong
pent-up demand and therefore inflating rents.
SHARP was designed to take advantage of this demand. Its
mixed-income developments targeted a higher income
clientele" in order to subsidize the low-income groups
within the projects. It was designed, in part, based on the
premise that if the inflation in rents continued, then the
cost to the state of encouraging new assisted development
would be minimized. Over time, as rent revenues increased,
the developments would become self-sustaining and the need for
47 Under the Section 8 programs, income eligibility is based on an
established threshold. Households must earn less than 80% of the median income
for the region (SMSA). SHARP targeted groups earning up to 130% of the median
income.
state subsidy would be reduced.
The shallow-subsidy mechanism worked tremendously well
initially. Many units were created and the cost to the state
was indeed minimal when compared to prior programs. Early
SHARP jobs were attractive, rented-up quickly, and demanded
top rents for their market components.
The 1980s, however, also saw the expansion of other forms
of housing in Massachusetts. As the ideal of a single family
home grew more and more out of reach for most, people began to
take a closer look at an alternative form of ownership -the
condominium. Developers wanting to capitalize on the low
vacancy rates and reacting aggressively to falling interest
rates turned to this more affordable option to the single
family home. Condominiums were developed in great numbers and
in good and not-so-good locations. Many of them were stocked
full of attractive amenities in order to lure buyers.
Condo developments were perceived as competition for the
SHARP developments. SHARP developers, arguing that more was
needed in order to compete with the luxury condos, sought to
improve the amenity packages available in their rental
developments. Health Clubs, dishwashers, and other amenities
were built into the SHARP jobs. While this improved their
marketability, it also increased their total development and
operating costs. As projects became more and more expensive
to build and operate, deeper subsidies were required in order
to maintain project feasibility.
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Eventually the market became over-built. The building
industry had overreacted to changes in the short-term interest
rates (for construction) and ignored many of the other factors
influencing demand for their products. In fact, as the
overall economy weakened and unemployment increased, certain
truths about the housing market became evident.
Demand had been driven primarily by increases in income,
in changing population demographics"8 , and in the number of
households formed49 . It had not been fueled by population
growth. Factors such as lower-wage employment, uncertainty
about the future, soon chilled demand. This coupled with the
massive overbuilding (in all areas of the real estate market),
inevitably caused housing prices to begin dropping. The
reversal (from low supply/high demand to high supply/low
demand) eventually burst the market's inflationary bubble.
Many of the SHARP jobs were developed based on the
expectation that the strong economy would create substantial
demand for housing in locations nearby to the employment
centers, particularly those around high tech plants. As these
employers began to suffer losses under the weakening economy,
however, many layoffs occurred leaving "sure thing"
developments suddenly without a market for their units.
48 Case, Karl E. "The Market for Single Family Homes in the Boston Area",
The New England Economic Review, May/June 1986.
49 According to Bob Kuehn, in times of economic prosperity, the number of
households tends to increase as more people move out on their own. There are
many smaller households demanding more units. Under a bad economy the trend is
reversed. People regroup, density increases, and less units are demanded.
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Factors Adversely Affecting the SHARP Portfolio
The changing marketplace had a profound effect on the SHARP
portfolio. It was not, however the only reason for the
financial difficulties encountered by the SHARP developments.
Indeed, other factors were seen as even more important than
(although partially related to) the downturn in the economy.
Chief among these was the higher than expected operating
expense budgets needed to properly operate the jobs. Many of
the early SHARP jobs were underwritten with operating budgets
of $2,500 per unit. In spite of 15 years of historical
information about the appropriateness of these budgets for the
market-driven developments, MHFA opted to rely on the
experience of the developers in running their jobs.
Developers, however, had an incentive to underestimate
the operating expense budgets. According to Bob Kuehn, "It is
tempting for some developers to underestimate.. .every dollar
saved gets an additional twelve dollars in mortgage, and you
can pay later..."
As operating information began to come in over time, MHFA
found that the projects were actually requiring operating
budgets of approximately $4,000 per unit. This represented a
significant shortfall in operations right from the outset.
Even if the projects could get the scheduled rents, losses
might be incurred because of unrealistic expense projections.
Today, MHFA is underwriting projects based on operating
budgets of around $4,500. This particular part of the pro
forma still causes significant debate between MHFA and
developers, who still try to "low-ball" the expense figure.
In all fairness to the developers, however, there have been
various significant and unexpected operating costs which have
had to be incurred. Security, for example, has turned out to
be a big expense item, particularly in those projects located
in the urban areas. Higher turnover originally than projected
has also led to increased maintenance costs.
Other Factors
Developers and staff cited several other factors
adversely affecting the jobs. These included: increased
development costs as upgrades and contingencies were built in
to improve occupancy; less than "prime" locations; unrealistic
trending assumptions; higher bond rates; over-building and
condominiums; lack of market experience of non-market rate
developers'0 ; timing of the developments coming on line.
With regard to the development cost issue, there is a
clear chain of events which are triggered as construction
costs increase. Higher construction costs result in higher
financing costs. These, in turn, lead to higher rents, and
eventually, result in a need for additional subsidy. Higher
construction costs (including upgrades, etc.) are evidenced,
50 One developer felt that non-profits or private developers, with
experience in only 100% low-income projects, might have trouble until they
realized that the market rate clientele was "different". Managers would have to
perform more marketing and maintenance in order to recruit and maintain this
clientele.
to some extent, in the average MHFA loan amounts awarded to
SHARP projects. In fact, the average loan amount per round
nearly doubled from $62,513 in Round I to $112,869 in Round IV
(only a 4 to 5 year period).
The competition from unsold condominiums is seen as a
major adverse factor for two reasons. First, condominiums had
an indirect effect on the cost of the SHARP developments.
Competition led to higher costs as SHARP developers tried to
increase the amenities available. The second effect was
simply in terms of supply. The abundance of condos created
more options for potential renters and served to either lower
or flatten rents and thereby eliminate SHARP's expectation of
inflation.
The appropriateness of the trending1  assumptions
incorporated into SHARP's design is also an area of some
contention. SHARP developments were originally underwritten
using 5% growth factors for both revenues and expenses. For
most, this projected a self-sufficient project by year 15.
While these growth factors clearly have not been
consistent with the actual market experience in the 1980s,
their use should not be viewed as a failure of the program.
These represented a "best estimate of what could work"5 2
51 In project underwriting, trending is used to project the future
performance of the development based on certain assumptions about future changes
in revenues and/or expenses. In most instances it is projected that these will
grow by a certain percentage in each year.
52 Gary Jennison, Corcoran-Jennison Companies, Member of the Governor's
Task Force on Private Housing Production. Interviewed in Quincy MA. in October,
1990.
SHARP' s proponents, both public and private, felt that any
issues could be reviewed and changed or tinkered with at a
later date53 . It was understood that there would be highs
and lows throughout the life of the project but that these
would average out over time.
Many of the later developments suffered simply from poor
timing. The most recent ones came on line just as the economy
was hitting bottom. Not having had the opportunity to get at
least a couple of years of operation behind them, they
suffered very slow rent-up periods and increased marketing
expenses. Earlier jobs at least had the benefit of being
completely rented-up and having some reserves built up.
Although, management, by and large, was not seen as a
negative factor by any of the persons interviewed it may be an
issue for the projects, however, if they are not run
efficiently. Michael Jacobs, Senior Development Officer at
MHFA, stated that there presently was not a strong incentive
for managers to operate the jobs efficiently. Since the
management fee is tied to the revenues of the developments (as
opposed to some other operations based figure (like Net
Operating Income, for example) there is an incentive to keep
rents high but not necessarily to keep operating costs down.
s3 This point is the underlying reason for the inclusion of the Section 2
"safety valve" in the program guidelines. Proponents wanted to get the program
started, but were wary of the experience of the 236 program. Many of the 236
developments had gone into default partly because there was no mechanism for
increasing assistance. SHARP proponents "left the door open" for a review of the
assumptions at a later date (and the possibility of increased assistance, if
needed).
Presently, developers will get the same fee whether
developments are run efficiently or not.
According to Eleanor White, MHFA had taken the position
that developers could manage the jobs as they saw fit. Once
the jobs came in for additional assistance, however, MHFA
under the restructuring process would closely scrutinize the
management budgets. If costs were not believed to be
reasonable, then they might likely be eliminated under
restructuring.
The Effect on SHARP
The net effect of these factors on SHARP developments was
that many of them began encountering operating losses. As
operating expenses increased higher than had been projected
and rents were not able to be increased as expected, forty
developments (representing half of the portfolio) were forced
to apply for additional SHARP assistance under the provision
included in Section 2 of the guidelines".
A Risk Analysis of the entire MHFA portfolio55, which
was undertaken to identify properties either experiencing, or
at risk of developing, significant operating and management
problems, identified SHARP developments, in particular, as
s4 This number would probably have been somewhat higher but many of the
developments just coming on-line did not meet the eligibility thresholds
established in the restructuring guidelines. These required "... at least one
full operating year after initial rent-up.. ." and " ... $400/unit in operating
deficits..."
" 1990 Risk Analysis, dated October 30, 1990, was prepared by Bob Carter
for presentation to the MHFA Collateral Security Committee.
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showing "financial distress" in light of the softness in some
of the local rental markets. In fact, out of the 19 MHFA
developments assigned maximum financial risk points, 16 of
them were SHARP jobs. SHARP developments comprised 10 of the
83 developments assigned moderate financial risk points and 16
of the 97 projects assigned low financial risk points. Many
of the remaining SHARP jobs were not able to be evaluated
because they lacked one full year of operating history.
As it became increasingly clear that financial troubles
were affecting the SHARP portfolio as a whole (as opposed to
individual projects with unique circumstances), developers,
MHFA, and EOCD, began extensive negotiations to develop
specific guidelines under which the Section 2 provision could
be exercised. The state was committed to live up to its
promise to re-evaluate the market and its impact on the
feasibility of the projects and the need for state subsidies.
The process took approximately six months before finalizing
specific guidelines in May of 1990.
Restructuring Issues
"The economic problem was not unforseen ... The projects
were underwritten with the expectation that if inflation kept
up then they'd be home free" was Eleanor White's response on
the subject of the need for restructuring the assistance
awarded to many of the SHARP deals. "The inclusion of Section
2 in the contract was our attempt to be realistic. We didn't
think that the crash would be as bad as it was, but we knew
that there was a clear contractual relationship".
Indeed, Ms. White and several others working to implement
SHARP were members of the "Class of '74"I. They understood
the real estate market's cyclical nature and knew that the
economy could go into another recession. Because of this,
they wanted to build flexibility into the program. This would
enable them to review the situation in later years and make
the necessary modifications.
The "Guidelines for Restructuring Operating SHARP
Developments" were designed to provide a framework for
strengthening the viability of developments facing financial
difficulties. Its specific goals were:
- To preserve the living environment of the low-income
families and other tenants residing in the developments.
- To protect and strengthen the economic viability of
the developments experiencing operating deficits.
- To preserve the physical integrity of the developments.
- To preserve the confidence of the bondholders and the
investment community.
- To use the least possible State resources to accomplish
these goals.
The basic premise to SHARP restructuring was that all
parties to the deals would be required to make concessions.
5 According to Gary Jennison, this was the name adopted by housing people
who had experienced the recession of that year. During that time the real estate
market had suffered tremendously. Given this experience, SHARP's proponents were
not eager to make the same mistake again.
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Developers would have to contribute additional equity to the
deals, EOCD would provide additional SHARP dollars (by statute
in the least amount necessary to ensure the financial
viability of the developments), and MHFA would have to relax
some of its underwriting requirements (such as debt service
coverage or replacement reserve deposits).
Under the guidelines, the requests for additional SHARP
assistance would fall primarily into two categories. These
categories were developed based on the understanding that
projects would have differing levels of need. Depending on
their need, projects would have to undergo more scrutiny and
their owners would also have to make a greater "contribution"
to the resolution of their financial difficulties.
The categories were also shaped by the extent of the
contractual obligation which MHFA and EOCD had to the
developments. A "Type I" project was one in which the
developers were seeking to make changes in their 15-year SHARP
contract schedule which would result in annual amounts "no
higher in any year than the existing year 1 amount of the
SHARP contract". Because the SHARP subsidy was based on a
year 1 maximum level multiplied by the fifteen year term of
the subsidy, MHFA and EOCD had a contractual obligation to
provide funding (if necessary) up to that maximum level for
each of the years.
A "Type II" project was one in which the developers were
seeking to make changes in their SHARP contract schedule which
would result in annual SHARP amounts "greater than the
existing year 1 amount. These were generally up to a maximum
of $1,600 per unit of additional annual SHARP over and above
the existing year 1 amount. Although EOCD and MHFA were not
contractually obligated to provide this additional assistance
($1,600), they opted to do so for two reasons. The first was
that these developments were in the MHFA portfolio and the
agencies felt that there was a "moral obligation" to help
them resolve their problems.
The second reason was the specter of possible litigation.
If the developments defaulted and MHFA was forced to
foreclose, the developers might be able to sue, arguing that
MHFA had been negligent in its underwriting review of the
project and that the developers had made "business decisions"
based on the Agency's approval of the operating pro formas.
The agencies were aware of recent court rulings in which
lenders had been held partly liable. Although MHFA's
potential liability was somewhat nebulous, this second issue
probably served to reinforce the agencies commitment to work
cooperatively with the developers to resolve the financial
difficulties.
Of the projects applying for restructuring in 1990,
approximately half requested Type I assistance and the other
half requested Type II assistance. The need for scrutiny and
documentation was directly related to each project's need for
additional funding. Type I requests were required to submit
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the following:
1. A $5,000 non-refundable processing fee. This was
primarily to pay for staff time to analyze and process
the requests, but also to weed out any unnecessary
applicants.
2. Audited financial statements for the operating years-
to-date.
3. A narrative explaining why additional assistance was
needed, along with a documented operating pro forma
showing what the project's performance would be through
year 16 if no additional assistance were granted. The
intent was to get a clear picture of where the project
stood at the time of application.
4. A description of the assistance requested.
5. An audited schedule of contributions which the
developer had already made to the development (exclusive
of the standard Letters of Credit (L/C) which developer
were required to post construction and operating
shortfalls.
6. A new 16-year pro forma showing the project's
performance if additional assistance were granted and
including any additional developer contributions5 7. In
order to demonstrate self-sufficiency after year 16,
developers were allowed to assume one of three options,
refinancing, resyndication, or conversion.
7. A description of developer contributions for future
years including direct cash contributions, increase in
the L/Cs to satisfy debt service coverage requirements,
and/or a deferral or decrease of their management fee.
Type II requests faced more scrutiny and an additional
financial burden. They were required to submit all of the
materials required for Type I as well as additional materials.
These included:
- a non-refundable fee of $250/unit (maximum $100,000).
- a copy of all syndication documents and a signed,
audited statement of sources and uses of the syndication
s7 Type I requests required additional equity contributions only if the
restructuring of the subsidy did not cure the projected deficits through year 15.
proceeds. If the job did not syndicate, a professional
analysis of the highest and best probable proceeds
had the job syndicated (an "imputed" syndication) . This
information would be used to determine the developers'
profit on the deal and to establish their required
contribution to the work-out.
- a certified list of all consultants used by the
development and a schedule of payments made to them.
Also a certified list of all general partners or persons
having financial interests in the jobs.
- a certified list of outstanding debts and account
payables.
In addition to these, the developers were also required
to sign a document basically agreeing to establish a Project
Security Account (PSA)58 and to forego any litigation against
EOCD and MHFA. Certain Transition Rules were incorporated
into the guidelines in order to encourage the developments to
submit their applications prior to October 1, 199059.
The restructuring process involved an exhaustive review
of various aspects of the jobs. The first step was a review
of the projects' initial underwriting. Staff examined the
expected development costs (a.k.a. Schedule B costs) for the
jobs and compared these to the final costs recognized when the
jobs "cost certified". The nature and cost of any change
orders were also examined for appropriateness. The projects'
rent-rolls were examined and compared to those of comparables
58 The PSA mechanism would work as a sinking fund which would initially
gain interest and then decline as withdrawals were made to cover future operating
deficits.
59 The reason for this was the change in administration at the state level.
With Governor Dukakis leaving office, there was some uncertainty as to Secretary
Anthony's continued tenure at EOCD. EOCD and MHFA wanted all additional funds
required to be committed and flowing to the jobs as soon as possible.
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to ensure that the jobs had been receiving the highest
possible rents.
Operating budgets were especially scrutinized to ensure
that the management agents were not incurring any superfluous
costs and that all expenses incurred were necessary and
unavoidable. Expenses proved to be an area of contention and
the developers' budgets were often reduced for the purposes of
restructuring projections.
Perhaps the biggest change in the projection of future
performance came when MHFA's Appraisal and Marketing
Department assumed a much more conservative posture with
regard to the trending assumptions for rents. Rather than
using the 4% and 5% figure for low-income and market rate
rents, respectively, the Agency in most instances used no
growth for the first three or four years, then 3% for the next
few years before finally trending at 5%. Although this would
inevitably result in additional SHARP subsidies to the jobs,
MHFA staff felt that these were the most realistic given the
condition of the market. Based on these assumptions, MHFA
determined that there would be a need in 1990 for an
additional $10 million in SHARP funding for the jobs.
Given the poor condition of the Commonwealth's coffers
and the political pressure on legislators to cut back
spending, however, the state was only able to appropriate $5.2
million for 1991. Of this amount, the lion's share ($3.2
million) went to the Harbor Point development" which has
been suffering serious rent-up problems and higher than
expected operating expenses. Harbor Point needed this amount
simply because of its scale. The balance was used to fund the
remaining troubled projects.
Type II developments received only 45% of the FY 1991
SHARP funds which they were entitled to based on need, while
Type I projects were funded in full. Since contracts were
signed for the $10 million requested, the state now has an
obligation to appropriate these funds for the developments at
a later time. In the interim, MHFA has agreed to make the
following concessions to help the projects through this
period:
- The additional .05 debt service coverage will not
require funding.
- Replacement Reserve deposits through June 30, 1991 will
be deferred.
-The required deposit to the PSA account, if any, will be
made available by the Agency for debt service payments.
- Existing replacement reserve balances will be
withdrawn.
- Debt service payments will be deferred and covered by
an arrearage note.
The question of whether the state will be willing or able
to appropriate the necessary funds to continue its commitment
60 Harbor Point (once the deteriorating Columbia Point public housing
project) is the largest and most aggressive public/private development ever
undertaken in Massachusetts. The development consists of 1,283 mixed-income
units housed in new and renovated buildings. 400 of the units will be available
in perpetuity to low-income households. SHARP funds represent only a portion of
the total public subsidy package awarded.
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to the developments depends to a great extent on future
direction of the Massachusetts economy, the actions of the
legislature and of the incoming administration. It is
expected, however, that the state will live up to its post-
restructuring agreements.
CASE STUDIES
Although many of the SHARP developments encountered
financial troubles (and therefore required restructuring),
there were still many other SHARP jobs which have performed
well. This raises a question about whether there are certain
characteristics present in the jobs which, either mitigated
the adverse effects of the poor economic climate and allowed
the project to continue to succeed or, conversely, which
contributed to the financial troubles of the development.
The intent of the following case studies, therefore, is
to study the characteristics and experiences of two real
projects, both relying primarily on SHARP's interest rate
reduction subsidy for their operations, and from this analysis
to be able to draw conclusions about the factors which may
affect the financial viability of these developments.
Several areas will be reviewed, including development
costs, use of other funding sources, amount of SHARP subsidy
needed, revenues and expenses (projected vs. actual), location
(i.e. external amenities such as access to transportation,
services, employment, market rate renters, etc.), design and
internal amenity package, and other outstanding issues.
PROJECT A: A SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT
Location and Amenities
The Project A development, consisting of 150 1, 2, 3, and 4,
bedroom apartment units, is housed in 9 separate one to three-
story buildings. The development includes 14 one-bedroom
units, 98 two-bedroom, 16 three-bedroom/one bath units, 10
three-bedroom/two-bath units and 12 four-bedroom two-bath
units.
Each of the apartments is equipped with an electric
range, dishwasher, disposal, air conditioning, and carpeting.
Thirty-eight of the units (or approximately 25%) are reserved
for use by low-income families. Eight of the units were
designed to be handicapped accessible.
The development, which also includes a swimming pool,
clubhouse, sauna, nautilus, recreation room, master antenna
and laundry facilities is located in an attractive suburban
bedroom community forty minutes outside of Boston. The
project's location is strong and is representative of MHFA's
desire to undertake developments in suburban areas. It is
located just off of a main roadway with a major interstate
highway close by.
Costs
When originally underwritten in 1987 (under the third
round of funding), the project required a $11,727,966 MHFA
loan (84% of the expected value). The developers, considered
to be very reputable and experienced, provided $2,252,784 of
their own equity. The project did not make use of any other
financing sources. The expected total development cost at
closing was $13,980,750, which represented a per unit cost of
$93,205. This cost was considered to be low relative to other
projects. When construction was finally completed in the
spring of 1989, the actual development costs had increased by
only $12, 280 (.1%) to a "recognized" total of $13, 993, 030 (see
Exhibit A) . There was actually a $496,825 increase in change
orders, however, this was mitigated by construction period
rental income totalling $574,238. 61.6% of the change orders
were for Optional Upgrades requested by the developers in
order to enhance the project's marketability. The other
significant change order cost was for unavoidable third-party
requirements. Other soft cost increases were small.
Revenues and Expenses
Total project revenues for the first year were expected
to equal $1,779,481 based on average market rents of
$747/month and low-income rents of $706/month (with tenants
paying only for electricity separately) . The year 1 SHARP
allocation of $510,578 was included in this figure (see
closing pro forma, Exhibit B). The MHFA financing rents for
the units were substantially lower than what they would have
needed to be had conventional financing been used (see below).
BREAKDOWN OF RENTS
1BR 2BR 3BR 3BR 4BR
@ CONVENTIONAL FINANCING:
LOW 1039 1193 1420 1420 1574
MARKET 1070 1236 1430 1445 1580
@ MHFA BELOW MKT. FINANCING:
LOW 784 938 1165 1165 1319
MARKET 815 981 1175 1190 1320
ATTAINABLE RENTS:
LOW 568 668 840 840 940
+ SHARP 216 270 325 325 379
784 938 1165 1165 1319
MARKET 599 711 850 865 950
+ SHARP 216 270 325 325 379
815 981 1175 1190 1320
Rents were projected to grow at a rate of 5% over time.
Expenses were underwritten at a level of $525,514 in the
first year, or about $3,500 per unit. Given current
experiences, this figure was slightly low but adequate for the
time. (Today, SHARP jobs typically average between $4,000 and
$5,000 per unit per annum). Expenses were projected to grow
at a rate of 5% over time. The project also had a debt
service obligation of $1,110,251 annually which consumed much
of the revenues.
SHARP Subsidy
The SHARP subsidy awarded to the project was originally
at a level of $3,401 per unit ($510,178 for the project in the
first year), which represented 100% of what the project was
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eligible for. This level of subsidy was expected to decline
steadily for the remainder of the 15-year term (see Exhibit
C).
Actual Experience
This project has been successful in achieving its rent
revenue projections to date. Because of its desirable
location and substantial amenities, the project continues to
attract and retain the market clientele (in fact, the project
maintains a waiting list for the market component) as well as
the low income clientele which receive Section 8 certificates.
A Performance Management Review (PMR), undertaken by MHFA in
1989 found that the development was well managed and well
maintained physically. The project did not require financial
restructuring.
Findings
Several factors have contributed to this project's
success. The construction costs, which were relatively low to
begin with, were kept in line during the construction period.
In fact, the total increase was only .1% which is unusual
since most projects' costs tend to increase during
construction.
The projects expenses were underwritten at realistic
levels and even at the MHFA rent levels, the project projected
a 1.13% debt service coverage ratio, which provides some
cushion against a possible weakening of the market.
The project's attractive suburban location, close
proximity and easy access to the greater Boston has been among
its important attributes. It is well designed and features
lush and well maintained landscaping which contribute to its
curb-appeal. The project also features many amenities at a
good price. As shown in the rent breakdown, rents for this
development are, on average, 20% to 25% lower than what they
would be at a comparable conventionally financed development.
In this regard the project is a very good deal for prospective
renters.
PROJECT NAME:
FUNDING ROUND:
COST CERT:
TOTAL UNITS:
COST CATEGORY
PROJECT A
III
0/00/89
150
SCHEDULE B COSTS
MHFA MORT:
DEV. EQUITY:
MHFA CERT. COSTS
11,727,966 TDC/UNIT:
2,252,784
------------ SCHED. B:
13,980,750 APPROVED:
COST CERT:
HARD COST/UNIT:
93,205
93,287
93,287
58,230
61,542
61,542
CHANGE PCT. CHANGE % OF HC DEV'L COST CERT
Construction
Change Orders as %
< of Construction Costs:
Unknown Condition
Optional Upgrade
Reduce Op. Costs
Ommission in Docs.
3rd Party Require.
Total Change Orders:
Survey/Permits
Archit. Design
Arch. Inspection
Contingency
Bond Prenium
Construct. Interest
Real Estate Taxes
Insurance
Site Inspect. Fee
Application Fee
Financing Fee
Legal Fees
Title & Recording
Acc't & Cost Cert.
Rent-up/Marketing
Land
Developer's 0/H
Developer's Fee
Appraisal
MHFA SHARP Fee
Oth-Rent. Inc.
8,734,500 9,231,325 496,825 5.7% 100.0%
5.7%
113,250
210,000
37,500
0
82,100
608,877
11,700
56,000
58,640
23,456
234,559
123,000
22,000
20,000
150,000
856,300
524,978
2,099,912
2,250
11,728
0
13,980,750
115,695
210,000
37,500
0
82,100
639,855
25,797
75,106
58,640
23,456
234,559
123,000
32,000
33,067
150,000
856,300
524,978
2,099,912
2,250
11,728
-574,238
13,993,030
10,011
306,106
0
4,165
176,543
496,825
2,445
0
0
0
0
30,978
14,097
19,106
0
0
0
0
10,000
13,067
0
0
0
0
0
0
-574,238
12,280
2.0%
61.6%
0.0%
0.8%
35.5%
100.0%
2.2%
0.0%
0.0%
NA
0.0%
5.1%
120.5%
34.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
45.5%
65.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
NA
0.1%
1.3%
2.3%
0.4%
0.0%
0.9%
6.9%
0.3%
0.8%
0.6%
0.3%
2.5%
1.3%
0.3%
0.4%
1.6%
9.3%
5.7%
22.7%
0.0%
0.1%
-6.2%
151.6%
9,231,325
115,695
210,000
37,500
0
82,100
639,855
25,797
75,106
58,640
23,456
234,559
123,000
32,000
33,067
150,000
856,300
524,978
2,099,912
2,250
11,728
-574,238
13,993,030
EXHIBIT B
MFA SBARP MORTGAGE APPLICATION 8/30/84
SUMYMARY OF PROJECT INCOME, EXPENSES
October 30, 1986
& DEBT SERVICE COVERAGE
ANNDAL IRENTA INCOKE
Mod/Market Units (Kttainable)
Low Income Units (S.8/707 Rents)
GROSS RESIDENTIAL INCOME
Less Vacancy Factor
Mod/Market Units 5 4
Low Income Units 5
Total Vacancy
1. EFFECTIVE RENTAL INCOME
(Fill in Projected Date 95% Occupany May 1988
INCOME FROM OTBER SOURCES (SPECIFY)
Laundry $6.00 x 150 units = $ 900 x 12
Parking spaces at $_ .. onth x 12
Less _ Vacancy
Show Calculations on-Attached Workrheet
$ 1,002,756
$ 321,984
$ 50,138
$ 16,099
$ 10,800
0
66,237)
$ 1,258,503
Other
Other
Other
TOTAL OTHER INCOME
SHARP LOAN (FIRST YEAR)
ANNDAL OPERATING EXPENSES
NET INCOKE 5 = 11+2+3(4))
DEBT SERVICE (Constant 0.094667
DEBT SERVICE COVERAGE RATIO ll.1
ACTUAL DEBT SERVICE COVERACE PLine
)z $ 11.727.966 loan
8 Must Equal Line 7)
$ 10,800
$510,178
(S 525,514)
$ 1,253,967
$ 1,110,251
113% 143,716
Rev.-2
PACE 3
TOTAL ANNUAL OPERATING EXPENSE SCHEDULE
PROJECT _ _ _ _ _
ITEM
MangemntFee
Administrative
Payroll Expenses'-Incl. Taxes, etc.
Legal
Audit
Marketing Expenses
Telephone
Office Supplies
Other Administrative Expenses
Sub-total - Administrative
Maintenance
Payroll Expenses-Incl. Taxes, etc.
Janitorial Materials
Landscaping
Decorating (interior only)
Repairs (interior and exterior)
Elevator Maintenance
Garbage and Trash Removal
Snos Removal
EAterninating
Pool Maintenance
Miscellaneous
Sub-total - Maintenance
Security
MORTGAGE APPLICATION PAGE
MHFA NO,
10/30/186 Rev. -2
EXPENSE SUBTOTAL EXPENSE PERU01
87,317 582
25,000
iL,0 Q
1,000
1,200
900
39,900
3,750
9,750
11,250
29,250--
10,200
4,305
900
4,250
805
42,750
114,360
0
167
10
27
7
8
6
36
295
-266
25
65
75
195
68
29
6
28
5
762
Utilities
Electricity
Gas
0 i1
Water and Sewer
Sub-total - Utilities
Utility Allowance (Section 8 Only)
Insurance
Oper. Exp. Before Tax & Rep. Res.
Taxes .
Real Estate Taxes
Other Taxes
Sub-total - Taxes
Replacement Reserve (.75% dir. con.)
Utility Allowance (Section 8 Only)
TOTAL ANNUAL OPERATING EXPENSES
22,300
59, 500
13,778
95,578
13,152
45,000
398,157
75,000
75,000
65,509
{ 13,152
525,514
149
397
92
637
88
300
2,654
500
500
437
( .88
3,503
S01WIARY OF ESTIMATED PROJECT COSTS
PROJECT-
Square Footage and Construction Cost Information
Gross Residential Non-Community Sq. Ft.
Gross Community Square Footage
Total Gross SquareFntage
Net Rentable Residen.tial Sq uare Foota e
ut Rkntable Res. SF as % Gross Res. F
Construction Cost per Total Gross -Sq. Ft.
Construction Cost per Residential Unit
(ctober 30, 1986 Rev.-
MORTGAGE APPLICATION PinP 5
,MHFA PROJECT NO.
162,210
2,185
164,395
142,264
87.2%
$ 53.13
58,230
Direct Construction Costs 8,734,500
Construction Fees
Surveys, Permits, etc. 113,250
Bond Premium (1.0 % dir. Const.) 82,100
Arch. Design (2.4 i dir. const.) 210,000
Arch. Inspec.( .4 % dir. const.) 37,500
Total Fees
Total Construction Costs
General Development Costs
Construction Loan Interest
monthS 14 '4rate 8.1+.5 588,353
Real Estate Taxes 11,700
Insurance 76,524
MHFA SHARP FcZ .12 11,728
MWFA Application Fee .2% 23,456
MHFA Financing Fee ( % loan) 234,559
Legal fees 123,000
Title and Recording Expenses 22,000
Accounting & Cost Certification 20,000
Rent-up and Marketing 150,00
Appraisal Fees 2,253U
Inspeaction Fee .54 58, 640
Total Gen. Development Costs
Developer's Fee (20% of Lines 1 & 2)
Developer's Overhead (5% of Lines 1 & 2)
.and 640,332 -sq.ft. p $ 1.337 per sq.ft.
rotal Replacement Cost
:quity - Developers' Fee @ 20Z
Cash
Total
.Oan
.oan/Replacecnt Cost Ratio
442,850
9,177,350
1,322210 .2
2,099,912
524,978 3
856,300 4
13.980,750 5
2,099,912
152,872
( 2,252,784 )6
11,727,966 7
83,9 %
___
M
EXHIBIT C
DiFA
FFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEVELOPMENT
Date: 9/15/86
Filename:
HARP DRAWDOWN ANALYSIS :sharp.draw.budget.20
roject Name:
,ocation:
ROJECT HISTORY:
:ommitment:
:losed/Funded:
:onstruction Start:
XHFA #:
Units:
[Dates)/ /86
/ /86
1/1/87
:onstruction Completion: 1/1/88
;umber of months after 7/1/85: 30
Project: Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
5HARP AMOUNT: $510,178 495,000 476,691
per month:
42,515 41,250 39,724
Year 6 Year 7 Year 8
M== === = M .= === M == ==
388,190 349,334 309,286
per month:
32,349 29,111 25,774
Year 11 Year 12 Year 13
169,222 117,688 63,527
per month:
14,102 9,807 5,294
Year 4 Year 5
= ==== = = = M
452,360 424,863
37,697 35,405
Year 9 Year 10
= === ===== =MMM
264,905 218,255
22,075 18,188
Year 14 Year 15
======= ===MM0=
6,608 0
551
FY: 1986:
1987:
1988: 255,08
1989: 502,589
1990: 485,846
0 1991: 464,525
0 1992: 438,611
9 1993: 406,526
1994: 368,762
1995: 329,310
1996: 287,095
1997: 241,580
1998: 193,738
1999: 143,455
2000: 90,607
SHARP Project #57 15 YEAR TOTAL: $4,246,107
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PROJECT B: A TROUBLED DEVELOPMENT
Location and Amenities
The Project B development consisting of 90 1 and 2 bedroom
apartment units (45 each) housed in 16 separate two-story
buildings. Each of the apartments is equipped with an
electric range, dishwasher, air conditioning, and carpeting.
Twenty-two of the units (or approximately 25%) are reserved
for use by low-income families. Five of the units were
designed to be handicapped accessible.
The development, which also includes a swimming pool,
community building, and laundry facility is located in an
attractive bedroom community about an hour outside of Boston.
The project's location is considered desirable. It was
located just off of a main highway with a major interstate
highway fairly close by.
Costs
When originally underwritten in 1987 (under the third
round of funding), the project required a $9,466,729 (88% of
the expected value) MHFA loan. The developers, considered to
be very reputable and experienced, provided $2,092,472 of
their own equity. The project did not make use of any other
financing sources. The expected total development cost at
closing was $11,559,201, which represented a per unit cost of
$128,436. This cost was considered to be very high. When
construction was finally completed in 1989, the actual
development costs had increased by $656,723 to a "recognized"
total of $12,215,924 (see Exhibit A). This 5.7% increase was
primarily due to change orders totalling $467,469, almost 73%
of which were for Optional Upgrades requested by the
developers in order to enhance the project's marketability.
The other significant cost increase was in the construction
interest line-item. This increase was due to a longer than
expected construction period (to perform the additional work)
coupled with some delays.
Revenues and Expenses
Total project revenues for the first year were expected
to equal $1,242,304 based on average market rents of
$925/month and low-income rents of $499/month (with most
tenants paying for heat, hot water, and electricity
separately). The SHARP allocation was included in this figure
(see closing pro forma, Exhibit B). Rents were projected to
grow at a rate of 5% over time.
This figure, however, also included a scheduled "developer
subsidy" of $145,000. This subsidy was included because of
the developers' desire to secure a larger loan amount. At
underwriting, the developers were faced with a difficult
decision. Construction costs were higher than what the
expected revenues could sustain over the first few years.
Given this, the developers could either pour additional
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equity into the project out of their pockets and maintain a
lower loan amount or they could agree to provide a Developer
Subsidy, each year for the first few years, and thereby
increase the sustainable loan amount. The developers opted
for the second scenario based primarily on two factors.
First, they felt that the economy would continue to grow and
that, given this, they could still leverage the higher loan
amount yet pay in over time. If rents grew faster, then they
would save money. The second reason was that a larger project
(i.e. more debt) was better in terms of what could be raised
through a possible syndication.
Rents for the project were projected to be extremely high
(see below), even at the MHFA below-market rate financing
BREAKDOWN OF RENTS
1BR 1BR 2BR 2BR
@ CONVENTIONAL FINANCING:
LOW 1343 1505 1451
MARKET 1379 1472 1653 1791
@ MHFA BELOW MKT. FINANCING:
LOW 977 1139 1085
MARKET 1013 1106 1287 1425
ATTAINABLE RENTS:
LOW 627 735 681
+ DEV/SUB 134 134 134
+ SHARP 216 270 270
977 1139 1085
MARKET 663 756 883 1021
+ DEV/SUB 134 134 134 134
+ SHARP 216 216 270 270
1013 1106 1287 1425
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terms. This was probably a result of high construction costs.
Still, it is difficult to believe that they could have been
achieved. Even at the MHFA financing rate, rents were not a
bargain, especially when tenants were expected to pay for
other utilities separately.
Expenses were underwritten at a level of only $256,500 in
the first year, or only about $2,850 per unit. Given current
experiences, this figure was clearly underestimated (SHARP
jobs typically average between $4,000 and $5,000 per unit per
annum) . It is possible that this figure was purposely "low-
balled" so that the project would appear to be able to sustain
a higher loan amount. Expenses were projected to grow at a
rate of 5% over time. The project also had a debt service
obligation of $901,608 annually which consumed most of the
revenues.
SHARP Subsidy
The SHARP subsidy awarded to the project was originally
at a level of $2,981 per unit ($268,308 for the project in the
first year), which represented 100% of what the project was
eligible for. This figure, however, was subsequently reduced
during the underwriting process to $2,921 per unit ($262,890
for the job) based on the developer's projected expense and
debt service levels. This level of subsidy was expected to be
maintained for the first seven years of operation. It would
then decline steadily for the remainder of the 15-year term
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(see Exhibit C). The fact that the subsidy was at 100% for
the first seven years gives an indication that it was
considered to be a weak project initially.
Actual Experience
The financial information for the development at
underwriting paints a troubled picture for the development
from the outset. It seems clear that, regardless of the
amenity package provided by the developers, the situation was
bound to worsen along with the overall economy in the years
following the closing of the financing commitment. High
construction costs, bad timing, unattainable rents, heavy debt
burden, and assumptions about the future growth of the market
(i.e. trending) proved inappropriate. All contributed to the
project's eventual application for additional SHARP subsidy
dollars.
Based on year 2 information provided in the developer's
restructuring pro forma, rent revenues, which had been
expected to grow somewhat, actually fell slightly. The major
operations problem, however, was that expenses, which had been
projected to be $269,325 in year 2, actually cost $470,165 (an
increase of 74% over what was projected) or about $5,224 per
unit. As a result, the job showed a deficit of $150,383 for
1990. The situation only worsened as these new figures were
projected over time (see developer's pro forma, Exhibit D).
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Restructuring is Needed
This project applied for additional assistance, in
September of 1990, under the Type II category. The developers
did so because they recognized that they would require
assistance over and above the year 1 amount in order to avoid
default and foreclosure. Excessive operating expenses deemed
it necessary.
The first step under was restructuring process was an
attempt to assess where the project stood financially. The
analysis included a review of the project's performance to-
date and also a computation of the "profit" which the
developers had made on the project (see Exhibit E). This
would help MHFA staff determine how much equity the developers
would be required to put back into the project in order to
help resolve its financial troubles (e.g. their contribution
to the Project Security Account (PSA).
The project's financial trouble stemmed from a number of
factors. Costs associated with obtaining and retaining market
rate tenants were higher than anticipated. This included
advertising, payroll for rental staff, and increased
maintenance on turn-over. Utilities and taxes were also
higher. On the revenue side, the soft market had frustrated
efforts to increase rents and bad debt losses were also higher
than anticipated.
MHFA also undertook an extensive analysis of the
project's operations. During the process it was determined
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that some of the costs were unreasonably high and therefore
should be disqualified for the purposes of future projections.
The agency also performed a market analysis for the project
and determined that future rents should be based on trending
projections of 0% for 1991, 3% for 1992-1993, and 5%
thereafter. Based on these new, more conservative,
assumptions, a new restructuring pro forma was developed (see
Exhibit F). This, more realistic, pro forma projected larger
losses for the project.
To this pro forma MHFA added any new developer
contributions required (because the developers had already
made equity contributions to cover losses, beyond their
calculated "Available Profit", and because they agreed to make
additional contributions, the minimum $1,000/unit PSA
requirement was waived). This new pro forma was used to
determine the new level of SHARP assistance which the project
would require.
The new assistance was calculated in two steps. For all
years in which the subsidy was not equal to the original year
1 maximum (years 8-15) the SHARP figure was increased to the
maximum. This was referred to as the Type I assistance (to
which they were "entitled") . Next, since the project required
extraordinary assistance $2, 000/unit6' of "Type II"
61 Under the special transition rules, developments which submitted
restructuring applications prior were eligible for this
"unusual level" assistance provided that they met certain other criteria.
Typical Type II assistance was $1,600 above the maximum year 1 SHARP.
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assistance was added in each of the years in order to fund the
remaining gap. In years where losses did not require the full
$2, 000 subsidy, the amount was nevertheless allocated to "pay-
back" deposits to the replacement reserve account and other
forgone costs (which had been deferred in order to alleviate
some of the burden). Once these costs were repaid, the
subsidy would only be limited to the amount necessary to
achieve 1.05 debt service coverage (assuming all required
costs were paid). Project feasibility beyond year 15 was
demonstrated assuming a refinancing of the project's original
mortgage and a commitment by the developers to continue to
subordinate a portion of their management fees.
The adjustments resulted in the calculation of a new
SHARP subsidy schedule (see Exhibit G) . This schedule
projected a new maximum annual subsidy cost of $4,981/unit.
The average annual subsidy amount over the term will be
$4,523/unit 2. The new schedule (as well as other provisions
of the restructuring) are then outlined in a Memorandum of
Understanding entered into by MHFA and the developers. SHARP,
through its restructuring provision, was able to save the
project from possible default.
Findings
This was a questionable project from the outset. Despite
62 It is important to note that the SHARP subsidy is reviewed each year to
determine whether the full amount is necessary. If rents grow at a higher rate
than projected, then the SHARP subsidy would be reduced accordingly.
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the project's strong location, the rents necessary to ensure
financial feasibility were much too high. Given that the
project is also located in an area in which many condominiums
have been developed, competition has compounded its current
financial problems.
The developers assumed a serious financial burden (88%
loan-to-value) in order to save money up front. This was only
made worse when construction costs increased because of
optional upgrades and construction delays. No other financing
sources were pursued to help bring rents down to more
marketable levels.
The project also suffered from severely underestimated
operating expenses so that, although rents have not dropped
off too much at present, operating expense increases have put
the project in a tenuous position. Marketing and maintenance
costs were much higher than expected as were taxes and
utilities. When these factors are coupled with poor timing
(the project only recently came on-line) in relation to the
current weak market conditions, the problems could only
worsen.
The case study has shown, however, that SHARP has been
able to respond to the project's financial troubles. Under
the restructuring provision, SHARP was able to re-evaluate its
assumptions in light of the current market and modify the
assistance provided. Under this scenario, the program is
still more cost effective than prior subsidy programs.
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It was able to achieve the stated goals of preserving the
living environment of the low-income families other tenants,
strengthening the economic viability of the developments,
preserving the physical integrity of the developments, and
preserving the confidence of the bondholders and investment
community. This was done at a, at the very worst, is no
greater than the cost of the 13A program in 1983.
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PROJECT NAME:
FUNDING ROUND:
COST CERT:
TOTAL UNITS:
Project B
III
00/00/89
MHFA MORT:
DEV. EQUITY:
9,466,729 TDC/UNIT:
2,092,472
---------- SCHED. B:
11,559,201 APPROVED:
COST CERT:
128,436
135,732
136,040
HARD COST/UNIT:
79,167
84,361
83,889
COST CATEGORY SCHEDULE B COSTS MHFA CERT. COSTS CHANGE PCT. CHANGE % OF HC DEV'L COST CERT
Construction 7,125,000
Change Orders as %
of Construction Costs:
UnknQwn Condition
Optional Upgrade
Reduce Op. Costs
Ommission in Docs.
3rd Party Require.
Total Change Orders:
Survey/Permits
Archit. Design
Arch. Inspection
Contingency
Bond Premium
Construct. Interest
Real Estate Taxes
Insurance
Site Inspect. Fee
Application Fee
Financing Fee
Legal Fees
Title & Recording
Acc't & Cost Cert.
Rent-up/Marketing
Land
Developer 0/H
Developer's Fee
Appraisal
Dev. Equity
Oth-Clerk of Works
Oth-Letter of Credit
Oth-Rental Income
72,000
237,250
80,000
0
44,062
610,603
3,000
30,000
47,334
28,400
189,335
40,000
35,000
35,000
57,877
375,000
429,368
1,717,472
7,500
375,000
20,000
0
0
11,559,201
7,592,469 467,469
144,450
237,250
52,133
0
46,543
781,665
8,712
59,104
47,334
28,400
189,335
30,115
35,000
5,000
91,342
375,000
429,368
1,717,472
0
375,000
22,222
27,069
-79,059
12,215,924
64,779
340,892
23,647
38,151
467,469
72,450
0
-27,867
0
2,481
171,062
5,712
29,104
0
0
0
-9,885
0
-30,000
33,465
0
C
0
-7,500
0
2,222
27,069
-79,059
656,723
6.6% 100.0%
6.6%
13.9%
72.9%
0.0%
5.1%
8.2%
100.0%
100.6%
0.0%
-34.8%
NA
5.6%
28.0%
190.4%
97.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
-24.7%
0.0%
-85.7%
57.8%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
-100.0%
0.0%
11.1%
NA
NA
5.7%
1.9%
3.1%
0.7%
0.0%
0.6%
10.3%
0.1%
0.8%
0.6%
0.4%
2.5%
0.4%
0.5%
0.1%
1.2%
4.9%
5.7%
22.6%
0.0%
4.9%
0.3%
0.4%
-1.0%
160.9%
7,550,000
151,215
336,623
52,133
0
46,543
719,240
8,712
59,104
47,334
28,400
189,335
45,001
35,000
5,000
91,342
375,000
429,368
1,717,472
7,200
375,000
26,567
27,069
-79,059
12,243,599
EINIBIT 3% (PAGE *1
FROJECT NAME,
ASSUMPTIOusi
ANNUAL INCREASE IN RENTS OF $1
ANNUAL INCREASE IN EIPENSES OF 51
TEAR
INCOME:
ANNUAL RENTAL INCOMEs
LOW INCOME UNITS (3.6/707)
MODERATE INCOME UEITS (IF ANT)
MARKET UNITS
0ROSS POTENTIAL RESIDENTIAL INCOME
LESS 39 VACANCT - LOU INCOME UNITS
LESS 51 VACANCI - MARKET UNITS
EFFECTIVE GROSS RESIDENTIAL INCOME
0ROS COMMERCIAL RENTS
LESS 10% VACANCI
PARKING INCOME
LESS 100 VACANCT
EFFECTIVE RENTAL INCOME
INCOME FROM OTNER SOURCES:
INCOME FROM LAUNDRI
INCOME FROM INTEREST
OPERATING DEFICIT (IF ANT)
(INDICATE SOURCE OF FUNDS)
SUSIDT SUPPORTING MODERATE
INCOME RENTS (IF ANT)
[INDICATE SOURCE OF FUNDS)
OT1ER SOURCES OF FNODS
(SPECIFI) SEVELOPER'S 8313T
TOTAL INCOME / OTNER SOURCES
SNARP SU5SIST LOAN
3 4 5 6 T I
169452 177925 186821 196162 205970 216268 2270S2 238436
693360 726028 764429 802651 842183 684923 929169 915621
662812
-5083
-3668
523061
905953
-5338
-36401
864213
951250
-5605
-38221
998813
-5885
-50133
90142 952795
1058153
-6179
-42139
1000435
1101191
-6585
-44246
1050457
1156251
-6612
I1102960
1214063
-1153
.4881
1151129
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
523061
0
866213
0
9075245
0
952195
0
1000535
0 0 0
105051 1102960 1155129
6480 6804 11tt 7501 7876 6270 864 9110
4873 sit 5372 5641 5923 6219 6530 6857
145000 )17500 67500
156353 129421 100017
262890 262890 262890
55000
262890
22500
36300
262890
15490 15215
262890 262890
15915
250000
TOTAL PROJECT INCOME 1242304 1256524 1270331 1283628 1299625 1327836 1381084 1414104
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EXHIBIT C
:FA
'FICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEVELOPMENT
Date: 9/11/87
-Filename:
UARP DRAWDOWN ANALYSIS :sharp.draw.budget.20
.oject Name: M~iFA *:
)cation: Units: 90
ROJECT HISTORY:
:mmitment:
losed/Funded:
onstruction Start:
[Dates]
/ /87/ /87
6/29/87
onstruction Completion: 8/1/88
umber of months after 7/1/85: 37
Project: Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
HARP AMOUNT: $262,890 262,890 262,890
per month:
21,908 21,908 21,908
Year 6 Year 7 Year 8
262,890 262,890 240,000
per month:
21,908 21,908 20,000
Year 11 Year 12 Year 13
80,374 33,306 0
per month:
6,698 2,776 0
Year 4 Year 5
262,890 262,890
21,908 21,908
Year 9 Year 10
230,000 210,676
19,167 17,556
Year 14 Year 15
0 0
FY: 1986:
1987:
1988:
1989: 240,98
1990: 262,890
o 1991: 262,890
0 1992: 262,890
o 193: 262,890
3 19S4: 262,890
1995: 262,890
1996: 241,908
1997: 230,833
1998: 212,286
1999: 91,232
2000: 37,228
;HARP Project # 15 YEAR TOTAL: $2,634,586
PROJECT NAME:
ASSUMPTIONS:
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
PROJECTIONS 10 YEAR 16
PROFORMA WITHOUT ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE
Increase In Market Unit Rents
Increase in Low Unit Rents
Market Unit Vacancy Rate
Low Unit Vacancy Rate
Increase In Oth r Income
Increase In Expenses
INCOME:
ANNUAL RENTAL INCOME
Low Income Units
Moderate Income units (If Any)
Market Income Units
Gross Potential
Less
Less
Residential Income
Vacancy @
Bad Debts
Effective Gross Potential Residential Income
Gross Commercial Rents
Less Vacancy @
Parking Income
Less Vacancy @
Effective Rental Income
200,000 208,000 216,320
686,000
86,000
S41:0001
833,000
720,300
28,300
46,1415
869,285
756,315
972,635
48,632
910,773
833,000 869,285 910,773
224,973 233,972 243,331 253,064 263,186 213,714
794,131
1, 19, 104
50,955)
13,892)
954,251
833,837
1, 67,809
953,390)
114,586)
999,832
875,529
1,118,860
55,943)
115,3151j
1,047,601
954,257 999,832 1,047,601
919,306
1,172,369
1,097,670
965,271
1it 28,1457
61,423)
116*8851
1,150,149
1,013,534
1, 87,248
164,362
117,729 1
1,205,156
1,097,670 1,150,149 1,205,156
Income From Other Sources:
Laundry.
Interest
Operating Dfict(fAl
t Indicate Soute of Funds)
Subsidy Sup ortina Moderate Income Rents (If Any)
Indicate Source of Funds
Other Sources of Fjds
Specify Developer's Subsidy
TOTAL INCOME / OTHER SOURCES
SHARP Subsidy Loan
TOTAL PROJECT INCOME
(1989 = $254,122)
2,000 2,100 2,205 2,315 2,431 2,553 2,680 2,814 2,955
6,000 3,000 3,150 3,308 3,473 3,647 3,829 4,020 4,221
117,500 87,500
125,500 92,600
262,890 262,890
1,221,390 1,224,775
55,000
60,355
262,890
1,234,018
22,500
28,123
262,890
1,245,270
5,904
262,890
1,268,626
6,199
262,890
1,316,690
6,509
240,000
1,344,179
6,834
230,000
1,386,984
7,176
210,676
1,423,009
5.00%4.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%5.00%
5.00%4.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
1991
3
5.00%4.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%5.00%
1990
2
5.00%
4.00%5.00%
5.00%
5.00%5.00%
5.00%4.00%
5.00%
5.00%5.00%5.00%
1992
4
5.00%4.00%5.00%
5.00%5.00%5.00%
1993
5
5.00%4.00%5.00%
5.00%
5.00%5.00%
1994
6
5.00%
4.00%
5.00%
5.00%5.00%5.00%
1995
7
1996
8
1997
9
1998
10
PROJECTIONS TO YEAR 16
PROFORMA WITHOUT ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE
ANNUAL OPERATING EXPENSES
NET OPERATING INCOME BEFORE DEBT SERVICE
DEBT SERVICE
% DEBT SERVICE COVERAGE
1990
2
1991
3
1992
4
1993
5
1,221,390 1,224,775 1,234,018 1,245,270
470,165 493,998 518,698 544,632
751,225 730,777 715,321
1994
6
1995
7
1996
8
1,268,626 1,316,690 1,344,179 1,386,984
571,864 600,457 630,480 662,004
700,637 696,762 716,233 713,699 724,980
901,608 901,608 901,608 901,608 901,608 901,608 901,608 901,608
0.83 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.80
(150,383) (170,831) (186,287) (200,971) (204,846) (185,375) (187,909) (176,628) (173,704)
PROJECT NAME:
PROJECT INCOME
BALANCE
1997
9
1998
10
1,423,009
695,104
727,904
901,608
0.81
EEEEEEEEE
\JH\MHINWSHP1
PROJECT NAME:
ASSUMPTIONS:
Annua
Annual
Annuaj
Annual
Annual
Annual
PROJECTIONS TO YEAR 16
PROFORMA WITHOUT ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE
Increase n Market Unit Rents
Increase n Low Unit Rents
Market Unit Vacancy Rate
Low Unit Vacancy Rate
Increase In Other Income
Increase In Expenses
INCOME:
ANNUAL RENTAL INCOME
Low Income Units
Moderate Income Vnits (If Any)
Market Income Units
Gross Potential Residential Income
Less Vacancy
Less Bad Deb ts
Effective Gross Potential Residential Income
Gross Comercial Rents
Less Vacancy @
Parking Income
Less Vacancy @
Effective Rental Income
Income From Other Sources:
Laundry
Interest
Operating fiit (fAyOIndicate Soupe of Funds)
Subsidy Sup ortna Moderate Income R nts (If Any)
Indicte Source of Funds
Other Sources of.F ds
(Specif Developer's Subsidy
TOTAL INCOME / OTHER SOURCES
SHARP Subsidy Loan (1989 = $254,122)
TOTAL PROJECT INCOME
284,662 296,049 307,891 320,206 333,015
1,064,211
1, 48,84
67,14
1,262,814
1,117,422 1,173,293 1,231,957
1, 13,41
170,674)
119,547J
1, 323,95
1,262,814 1,323,250
1,481,184
174,059)
(20,5241
1,386,600 1,453,005 1,522,614
3,103 3,258 3, 3,59 371
4,432 4,654 48 5131 5, 88
7,535
80,374
1,350,723
7,912
33,306
1,364,468
8,307
9,038
1,403,946
5.00%
4.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
4.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
4.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.001%
5.00%
4.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
199911
5.00%4.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
2000
12
2001
13
5.00%4.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%5.00%
2002
14
2003
15 200416
1, 52,164
177,608)
121,550)
1,453,005
1,293,555
1, 26,570
1,522,614
346,335
1,358,233
1,704,568
~85,228]
1,595,581
0
1,595,581
3,9605,657
8,723
0
1,461,728
9,159
0
1,531,773
9,617
0
1,605,198
PROJECTIONS TO YEAR 16
PROFORMA WITHOUT ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE
ANNUAL OPERATING EXPENSES
NET OPERATING INCOME BEFORE DEBT SERVICE
DEBT SERVICE
% DEBT SERVICE COVERAGE
BALANCE
1999
11
2000
12
2001
13
2002
14
1,350,723 1,364,468 1,403,946 1,461,728
729,860 766,353 804,670 844,904
620,863 598,116 599,276 616,824
1,531,773
887,149
644,624
901,608 901,608 901,608 901,608 901,608
0.69 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.71
(280,745) (303,492) (302,332) (284,784) (256,984)
PROJECT NAME:
PROJECT INCOME
2003
15
2004
16
1,605,198
931,506
673,691
901,608
0.75
(227,917)
EXHIBIT A
COMPUTATION OF AVAILAND PROJECT SECURITY ACCOUNT REQUIREMENT
DEVELOPER'S COMUPATATION VS. ADJUSTMENTS MADE AS PART OF REVIEW December 5, 1990
DEVELOPER'S PROFIT
GROSS SYNDICATION IMPUTED.
- THIRD PARTY COSTS OF SYNDICATU
+ DEVLPR'S O/H PROVIDED IN THE MTG
- OWNER'S CASH EQUITY AT INITL CLOSE
= TOTAL DEVELOPER PROFIT
ALLOWABLE ADJUSTMENTS
- DEVELOPER OVERHEAD (NOT TO EXCEED 5%)
- APPRVD CHANGE ORDERS: 3RD PTY REOMTS
- APPRVD CHANGE ORDERS: UNKNOWN CNDTHS
- APPROVED CHANGE ORDERS: OMISSIONS
- APPRVD CHANGE ORDERS: REDUCE OP COST
- APPRVD CHANGE ORDERS: OPTL UPGRADE (3%)
SUBMISSION ADJUSTED
1,352,392 971,463
-252,859 -252,859
429,368 429,368
-375,000 0
--------- ---------
1,153,901 1,147,972
429,368
195,651
65,132
23,647
-9,150
213,750
12 - MHFA TYPE TWO APPLICTN FEE AND EXPENSES 22,500
13 - CERTIFD SOFT COST OVERRUNS APPRVD 343,563
14 + CERTIFIED SOFT COST SVGS TO OFFSET -154,311
15 - DEVLPRS SUBSIDY BUDGETED 8 COMMITMENT 0
16 TOTAL ALLOWABLE ADJUSTMENTS 1,130,150
17 NET DEVELOPER'S PROFIT 23,751
18 - ALLOWANCE FOR TAXES (20% OF NET PROFIT) 4,750
19 AVAILABLE DEVELOPER'S PROFIT 19,001
20 * PERCENTAGE REQUIRED TO CONTRIBUTE 100%
21 GROSS REQUIRED DEVELOPER'S CONTRIBUTION 19,001
ADJUSTMENTS
22 - OWNERS ADVANCES, OPRTG DEFS FROM CASH
23 FROM LOC
24 REQUIRED DEPOSIT TO PSA (MIN $1,000/UNIT)
25 CONTRIBUTION ABOVE AVAILABLE PROFIT
429,368
38,151
64,779
23,647
0
213,750
22,500
NOTES
'86 Laventhol & Horwath projectn. Represents $1.60
gross raise per S1 of credit - 1 costs. OK.
8-yr payin adjsted for PV w 8% discount rate
Actual Land Cost S344,695. S375,000 covered by mt
S375,000 counted in ap. & cost cert as "equity
DLT Records. S97,50Q c/o requested reclassified a
as 3rd party reqnt. DIET denied.
(Total optional upgrades, at 340,892, exceeded 3%)
343,563 Cost Certified. Includes construction loan
-154,311 interest; rent up; insurance; permits)
427,500 Yrs 1-5, scheduled per underwriting.
1,408,947
-260,975
0
-260,975
100%
-260,975
-262,500 0
-160,000 -109,080
103,598
0 0
N=Z===Z SZ==Z===
-403,499 -266,457
Moved "above line", since budgeted at commitment.
Agency-Recognized Oprtg Losses, Calendar 1989-90
1990 Loss To Be refunded through retro SHARP
Waiver of PSA Subject to Provision of Alternative
Security ($107,291 Owner's Subsidy LOC)
"EXHIBIT B**
Trending:
Trending:
Vacancy:
Vacancy:
Trending:
Trending:
I INCOME SCHEDULE
LOU INCCIE
MARKET INCOME
2 GROSS RSDNTL INC
VACANCY,SAD DEBT
OTNER (EMPLOYEE APT)
90-91 92-93 94-02
Market Units:
Low Units:
Market Units:
Low Inc Units:
Other Inc:
Expenses:
(5/1/89-12/31/89
YEAR 1
0
0
521,288
27,960
5,350
3 EFFECT. RESIDL INCOME
+ OTHER INCOME (PRIOR TO ASSTCE):
LAUNDRY
INTEREST
DEVELOPER SUSIDY (ORIG.)
OTHER
SuARP SUBSIDY (ORIG.)
4 TOTAL PROJECT INCOME
5 EXPENSE SCHEDULE
MGMT FEE (5% entrct vs 3.6 ap,
ADMINISTRATION
MAINTENANCE
SECURITY
UTILITIES
WATER & SEWER
INSURANCE
R/E TAXES(esmes no abatemt)
OTHER TAXES & INS.
RPLCNT RESRVE (89,90 deferre
OTHER (ADP for sit yrs)
0.0%
4.0%
7.0%
3.0%
5.0%
5.0%
1990
YEAR 2
218,000
686,000
904,000
53,000
0
0.03
4.0%
7.0%
3.o%
5.0%
5.0%
1991
YEAR 3
226,720
686,000
912,720
54,822
0
0.05
4.0%
7.0 
3.OX
5.0%
5.0X
1992
YEAR 4
235,789
706,580
942,369
56,534
0
487,978 851,000 857,898 885,835
1,169
6,793
145,000
436
163,933
805,309
.aun...
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES 246,448(vs. 470,474 State St, 90) --------
NOt 558,861
33333.3.
NNFA DEBT SERVICE 564,343
% DEBT SERVICE COVERAGE 99.0%
33333333
Addtl Sbiseid req 6 105% 5,482
Max SNARP 9 2O/unit + ve) N/A
660/unit FAF ------------
Min Addtl DevContrb. Needed N/A
- max covd by s.dsord mgmt fee
- max covd by suAord ADP fee
6,000
2,000
117,500
0
262,890
1,239,390
56,095
81,800
149,000
1,000
30000
20,000
13,000
70,000
0
14,438
6,048
441,381
798,010
901,608
88.5%
148,36793
148,679
148,679
4,000
2,100
87,500
0
262,890
1,214, 388
56,344
85,890
156,450
1,050
31,500
21,000
13,650
73,500
0
24,750
6,350
470,485
743,904
.u.....
901,608
82.5%
202,785
185,418
0 17,367
0 25,460
0 6,350
RECOMNESE D RENT
1§R/18A
BR/1.SA
2BR/1.5A
2SR/2.5A
1993
YEAR 5
245,220
727,777
972,998
58,301
0
199
TEAR 6
255,029
764,166
1,019,195
61,143
0
12/5/90
#LOW INC 0 MARKET
$765 0$785 11
.895 3
. 945 9
1995 19 6
TEAR 7 TEAR S
265,230 275,540
802.375 842,493
1,067,605 1,118,333
64,123 67,250
0 0
1997
TEAR 9
266,873
84,616
1,171,491
70,529
0
914,697 95.053 1,003,482 1,051,063 1,100,962
4,200 4,410 4,631
2,205 2,315 2,431
55,000 22,500 0
0 0 0
262,890 262,690 262,890
1,210,130 1,206,812 1,228,004
33333333 ........ s.u..o.
57,756 59,216 61,400
90,185 94,694 99,428
164,273 172,486 181,110
1,103 1,158 1,216
33,075 34,729 36,465
22,050 23,153 24,310
14,333 15,049 15,602
77,175 81,034 85,085
0 0 0
25,988 27,287 28,651
6,668 7,001 7,351
492,604 515,605 540.820
-- -- ------- --------.. ...
717,526 691,007 687,185
901,608 901,608 901,606
79.6% 76.6 76.2%
229,163 255,682 259,503
185,418 185,418 185,418
-----------------------------
43,745 70,264 74,085
25,866 26,287 26,910
6,668 7,001 7,351
4,862 5,105
2,553 2,680
0 0
0 0
262,690 240,000
........ .........1,273,786 1,296668 1
33333333 33333333
63,689 64,943
104,400 109,620
190,166 199,674
1,276 1,340
38,288 40,203
25,526 26,602
16,592 17,421
69,340 93,807
0 0
30,064 31,566
7,719 8,105
706,707 705,365
...... m...... .
901 608 901 608
&.4X A.2%
239,962 241,323
185,418 206,306
54,54 33,015
27,564 27,104
7,719 8,105
5,360
2,814
0
0
230,000
339,136
66,957
115,101
209,658
1,407
42,213
28,142
18,292
98,497
0
33,167
8,510
621,945
717,192
m....
901 6084
.51
229,497
218,308
11,169
27,322
8,510
TOTAL Addtl Dev Cent 107,291 0 11,210 36,976 39,624
EXCESS FUTURE SHARP TO REPAY OWNERS/RR LOANS
(cumulative)
19,281 0 0
EXHIBIT 8, p. 2
Restructuring Pro-Forms
1998
YEAR 10
296,346
928,849
1, 227,197
73,970
0
1,153,227
5,628
2,955
0
0
210,676
1,372,486
68,624
120,856
220,141
1,477
44,324
29.549
19,207
103,422
0
34,626
8,936
651,361
721,125
-S33oa.
901,608
80.0%
225,563
237,632
1999
YEAR 11
310,262
975,291
1,285,573
77,579
0
1,207,994
5,910
3,103
0
0
80,374
1,297,381
Manassas
64,869
126,899
231,146
1,551
46,540
31,027
20,167
106,593
0
36,567
9,362
676,743
620,636
assesses
901 608
326,051
367,934
2000
YEAR 12
322,693
1,024,056
1,346,749
81,365
0
1,265,384
6,205
3,258
0
0
33,306
1,306,154
65,406
133,244
242,705
1,629
46,867
32,578
21,176
114,023
0
38,395
9,852
707,875
600,278
ameness
901,606
66.6%
sasmuu
346,410
388,931.
2001
YEAR 13
335,601
1,075,259
1,410,860
85,336
0
1,325,524
6,516
3,421
0
0
9,038
1,344,496
wa.33w3.
67,225
139,906
254,641
1,710
51,310
34,207
22,234
119,724
0
40,315
10,344
741,816
602,682
901,606
66.8%
meanness
344,007
344,007
0 0 0 0
27,322 27,106 21,381 19,854
6,510 6,936 9,382 9,852
2002
YEAR 14
349,025
1,129,022
1, 478,047
89,502
0
1,386,544
6,841
3,592
0
0
0
2003
YEAR 15
362,986
1,185,473
1,548,459
93,873
0
1,454,586
7,183
3,771
0
0
0
2004
YEAR 16
377,505
1,244,746
1,622,252
96,457
0
1,523,794
7,543
3,960
0
0
2005
YEAR 17
392,606
1,306,984
1, 699,589
103, 267
0
1,596,322
7,920
4,158
0
0
1,398,977 1,465,541 1,535,297 1,608,400
33333e33 33333333 3S33333n 33333g33
69,949 73,277 76,765 60,420
146,901 154,246 161,958 170,056
267,583 280,962 295,010 309,760
1,796 1,886 1,980 2,079
53,876 56,569 59,396 62,368
35,917 37,713 39,599 41,579
23,346 24,513 25,739 27,026
125,710 131,995 136,595 145,525
0 0 0 0
42,331 44,447 46,670 49,003
10,861 11,404 11,975 12,573
778,269 617,014 857,688 900,390
620,706 648,527 677,609 708,010
901,606 901,606 662,473 662,473
68.8% 71.9% 102.3% 106.9%
325,980 298,161 17,968 -12,414
325,960 298,161 0 0
0 0 17,98 0
19,506 19,961 20,912 21,906
10,344 10,861 11,404 11,975
2006
YEAR 18
406,310
1,372,333
1,780,63
108,313
0
1,672,330
6,316
4,366
0
0
1,685,012
u.33a..s
84,251
178,559
325,248
2,163
65,466
43.657
28,377
152,801
0
51,453
13,202
945,219
739,73
662,473
111.7%
-44,196
0
0
22,952
12,573
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12.069 41,663 42,521 0 "Surplus" SHARP apptied to 1) $20,016 Arrearege Not
12,069 53,952 96,473 96,473 2) $26,813 Reserve Loan; and 3) $51,800 Owner's
2007
YEAR 19
424,642
1,440,949
1,865,592
113,606
0
1,751,986
8,731
4,584
0
0
1,765,302
suessuaa
88,265
187,487
341,511
2,292
68,761
45,840
29,796
160,441
0
54,026
13,862
992,262
773,020
662,473
116.7%
-77,423
0
0
24,047
13,202
0
L;
Loans
I1n
2
3
12/5/90
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the introductory segment of this thesis, several goals
were laid out. These included analyzing the factors
influencing SHARP's design and the connections to prior
legislation and/or debates (addressed in Chapters I, II, and
III), reviewing SHARP's goals and determining whether or not
these had been achieved (addressed in Chapter IV), analyzing
SHARP's restructuring mechanism and its related issues
(addressed in Chapter V), and finally to make findings about
the program and assess its future (which will be the subject
of this chapter).
In addition to these goals, several questions were asked.
Are present problems the result of some flaw in the program's
design or are these attributable more to other factors which
impact on the success of individual projects? Should the
program be modified or "restructured" in some way so that the
housing created can be better protected or is what we are
seeing today simply a "blip" which will be overcome over the
long-term? Can any program, whose success is linked more
closely to the market, can be designed without endangering the
financial stability of the projects over both the short and
long-term? These questions should now be answered in terms of
108
the results of the research performed.
The SHARP Legacy
SHARP has made many contributions to housing development
in Massachusetts. It has done so, not just in terms of unit
production (averaging over 1,500 units per year since its
inception), but also in the way in which those units were
delivered. SHARP was innovative in its design, in the way in
which various available subsidy mechanisms were "married", and
in the way that federal funds were leveraged to boost housing
construction at a time when no other housing was being built.
SHARP was designed first and foremost as a production
program. It was not really designed as an affordable housing
producer but this sub-goal was also able to be achieved. In
this regard, using the shallow production subsidy with the
deep demand side subsidy was indeed a clever innovation.
Since its inception, 9,369 units have been created in 82
developments across the state. Many of the program's benefits
have been indirect. The program has produced $824 million in
MHFA financing and leveraged another $107 million of other
funds to the state. The program has and/or will also generate
some 8,206 construction jobs, $1.22 billion of revenues to the
private sector, and $226 million in public sector revenues63.
The fact that SHARP is a mixed-income program is also
63 Calculations are based on 9,369 SHARP-assisted units including dollars
spent for materials, wages, utilities and management. 1990 MHFA Annual Report.
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important. It demonstrates that people of varied economic
means can indeed live and prosper together in the same
environment. This social aspect is a continuation of a long
tradition at MHFA. Through SHARP, MHFA and also EOCD, have
been able to continue to demonstrate that affordable housing
need not be ugly, readily identified, or isolated. SHARP
developments, in many instances, represent the "best housing"
in terms of design and maintenance in many of the communities
where its located. SHARP developments often have the best
locations as well. While this is a necessary ingredient for
their success, it also provides a tremendous benefit to the
low-income tenants living there as well. Perhaps these are
its greatest contributions.
Restructuring
The 1990 restructuring process has shown us that the
SHARP program has needed and, indeed, been able to adapt to
changing economic climate. Based on preliminary information,
it appears that all of the developments in the portfolio will
remain financially stable (as long as sufficient funds can be
allocated to meet the new subsidy obligation). This is an
important point in terms of comparison with previous programs
such as Section 236. Had SHARP not purposely been designed to
be more flexible in terms of reacting to unexpected market
forces, many of the projects might be in the process of
defaulting today.
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This process has also shown, however, that the program
may have been too enthusiastic in its expectations. Twenty of
the forty projects undergoing restructuring required
assistance over and above that which was allowed under the
Section 2 "safety valve". Many of these projects were granted
assistance up to $2,000 per unit above the maximum year 1
levels. Again, had the state not made a decision to provide
this "unusual level" of assistance, these developments would
no doubt have defaulted on their financial obligations (thus
causing additional undesired problems).
The research has shown that many factors, in addition to
the downturn in the economy, contributed to SHARP's present
problems. These included operating expenses, which for
various reasons, were underwritten at unrealistically low
levels, unanticipated costs such as security in the urban
developments, very high total development costs as SHARP
developers sought to compete with the condominium market,
unrealistically high projected rent levels, less than "prime"
locations, and simply poor timing in terms of when the
developments were coming on-line. When combined, these
factors put a serious strain on the financial viability of the
developments.
Some of these might have been avoided had certain policy
decisions been made along the way. The issue of growing total
development costs is one example. While some of this growth
was probably caused by high construction costs, part of it is
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undoubtedly linked to the decision to compete with the booming
(and increasingly over-built) condominium market. Competition
from unsold condominiums should have been an indicator that
the high end of the rental market (which SHARP targeted) was
already being served and that SHARP might be better off
redirecting its resources towards another under-served (read:
lower income) segment of the population.
Since SHARP is by design a market driven program, special
care needs to be taken with regard to identifying and tracking
those market forces which affect real estate overall. Changes
in population, employment, income, competition (present and
future) are all important factors affecting the real estate
equation. As such, they need to be watched carefully.
In this regard, SHARP may have been a victim of its own
success and, perhaps, the issue is not one of changing the
program, but changing how (or when) it is administered.
During an interview, Joe Flatley, stated that, "Used
correctly, the program can smooth out the cycles of the real
estate market64." SHARP should solve the supply/demand
mismatch. This is possibly the way the program should be
used.
In times of high demand and low supply, SHARP could be
used to encourage production. Conversely, in times of high
supply and low demand the program could be shut down. The
market seemed to be making that turn from high demand/low
" Joseph Flatley, Interviewed in October 1990, in Boston, MA.
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supply to low demand/high supply sometime between 1986-1988.
A decision could have been made at that time to shut the
program down or at least cut it back and reallocate resources
elsewhere.
Of course a decision to shut down is easier said than
done. There are policy questions (such as, when is enough?),
pressures form various groups, including the private
development community, to contend with. The question of
running the program counter-cyclically must at least be
explored in that it is directly related to the "bad timing"
question facing many of the latest developments.
Restructuring has also had its positive side. Under
restructuring the state has been able to take a serious look
at the way in which the developments were being operated. It
has been able to scrutinize the developments' expenses and,
where possible, trim away unneeded costs. It may also mean a
more involved relationship with the management of the
developments. In light of this, the projects should run much
leaner and tighter in the future. This in itself is positive.
A key aspect of the program for the broader population is
that, under the right conditions, it can be replicated
elsewhere. The program makes use of mechanisms already
available to the states so that it could be implemented
without too much reorganization of existing systems.
Its important to note, however, that the program does
require a particular set of circumstances in order to work
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most efficiently, including pent-up demand for rental housing,
falling interest rates, a growing economy, good locations,
good design and amenities, and a supportive public
infrastructure to coordinate the various resources brought
together under the program. Production can be induced in
times of high demand so that demand and supply do not become
too mismatched (as is common under a pure market sector
scenario).
SHARP's ultimate legacy will depend on its performance
over the long-term. The health and financial viability of its
developments will be key to how it is perceived. Its future
success will inevitably tied to how adjustments are made to it
at both the micro- (i.e. operating expense control) and macro-
(i.e. watching key economic factors) levels. SHARP was, after
all, designed with this understanding that it could be
tinkered with and adjusted with the benefit of experience.
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